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Making Privacy Injuries Concrete
Peter Ormerod*
Abstract
In recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly said
that the doctrine of Article III standing deprives the federal
courts of jurisdiction over some lawsuits involving intangible
injuries. The lower federal courts are carrying out the Supreme
Court’s instructions, and privacy injuries have borne the brunt
of the Court’s directive. This Article identifies two incoherencies
in the Court’s recent intangible injury decisions and builds on
the work of privacy scholars to fashion a solution.
The first incoherency is a line-drawing problem: the Court
has never explained why some intangible injuries create an
Article III injury in fact while others do not. The second problem
is more fundamental: the Court has never provided a
justification for using counter-majoritarian constitutional
standing to deprive plaintiffs of a remedy against companies
engaged in abusive informational practices. These incoherencies
have sparked much confusion in the lower courts and have
invited curious arguments that the Constitution prohibits courts
from adjudicating all but the narrowest sliver of privacy
disputes.
To address the line-drawing and counter-majoritarian
problems, this Article builds on Helen Nissenbaum’s contextual
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For helpful comments and conversations, I’m grateful to Sebastian Benthall,
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Spencer Faircloth, and Jessica Posa for essential research assistance.
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integrity framework. Contextual integrity observes that privacy
is context specific and that privacy violations are the byproduct
of practices that violate entrenched informational norms.
Constructing a legal framework based on contextual
integrity solves both problems: contextual integrity provides
courts with a principled way to distinguish between
informational practices that are injurious and those that are not,
and contextual integrity supplies courts with a persuasive
justification for dismissing cases divorced from shared
conceptions about abusive informational practices. The legal
framework proves useful in understanding the statutes and
circumstances that create justiciable privacy injuries.
It’s too late to undo all the havoc wreaked by the Court’s
constitutional standing cases. This Article proposes a
mechanism for cabining the doctrine’s most extreme implications
and provides courts with a consistent and coherent way to protect
privacy.
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INTRODUCTION
Article III of the U.S. Constitution provides that the federal
judicial power extends to “Cases” and “Controversies.”1 In recent
decades, the Supreme Court has interpreted this simple
provision to limit who can maintain a lawsuit in federal court
and to what kinds of cases federal jurisdiction extends.2 This
doctrine, known as Article III standing, requires plaintiffs to
show three things: that they have suffered an injury in fact; that
the defendant caused the injury; and that the federal courts can
redress it.3 An injury in fact, according to the Court, is a concrete
and particularized injury that is actual or imminent and not
speculative or conjectural.4

1.
2.
3.
4.

See U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 2.
See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
Id.
Id. at 560.
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The Court only began using the injury in fact requirement
to invalidate legislation that authorizes lawsuits in the last
thirty years, and limits on suits against non-governmental
actors are more recent still.5 The Court’s initial rationale for
counter-majoritarian constitutional standing was premised on
preventing judicial interference with the Executive Branch.6
But over time the Court has supplemented the interference
rationale with a broader justification—one premised on a
cabined interpretation of the cases that the federal judicial
power reaches.7
The Court’s interpretation of the injury in fact
requirements—of concreteness, particularity, and actuality or
imminence—erects a jurisdictional barrier that a plaintiff
asserting a privacy harm can only occasionally overcome.8 In the
past decade, privacy has fared particularly poorly in three cases
at the Supreme Court.

5. In 1992, “the Court held that Article III required invalidation of an
explicit congressional grant of standing to ‘citizens.’ The Court had not
answered this question before.” Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After
Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 165
(1992). “The apparently unanimous view of lower courts had been that a
legislative grant of citizen standing was constitutional even without a showing
of injury in fact.” Id. at 165 n.10; see also infra Part II.B.2. But cf. Muskrat v.
United States, 219 U.S. 346, 358–59 (1911) (“The article does not extend the
judicial power to every violation of the Constitution which may possibly take
place, but to a ‘case in law or equity’ in which a right under such law is asserted
in a court of justice.” (internal citation omitted)).
6. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577 (“To permit Congress to convert the
undifferentiated public interest in executive officers’ compliance with the law
into an ‘individual right’ vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress to
transfer from the President to the courts the Chief Executive’s most important
constitutional duty . . . .”).
7. Cf. Felix T. Wu, How Privacy Distorted Standing Law, 66 DEPAUL L.
REV. 439, 439 (2017) (“Whereas older standing cases focused on whether the
plaintiff before the court was the right plaintiff, the newer privacy-based cases
are focused on, or making assumptions about, whether or not the harm caused
by the defendant is the right kind of harm.”).
8. See Lexi Rubow, Standing in the Way of Privacy Protections: The
Argument for a Relaxed Article III Standing Requirement for Constitutional
and Statutory Causes of Action, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1007, 1008 (2014)
(“Privacy law plaintiffs have encountered great difficulty in establishing
standing because the abstract and context-specific nature of privacy harm does
not fit well with current, rigid judicial conceptualizations of injury-in-fact.”).
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In 2013’s Clapper v. Amnesty International USA,9 the Court
held that plaintiffs alleging unconstitutional surveillance lacked
standing because they could not prove their harm was “certainly
impending.”10 It did not matter, the Court explained, that the
plaintiffs expended time, effort, and money to avoid the
surveillance, because self-inflicted mitigation costs could not
“manufacture” standing.11 In the years since, many lower courts
have relied on Clapper to dismiss cases arising from data
breaches, reasoning that victims cannot show a certainly
impending financial injury and that their mitigation measures
are irrelevant.12
In 2016’s Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins,13 the plaintiff alleged that
the defendant’s website disseminated a host of falsehoods about
him.14 Despite Congress’s choice to authorize the suit by statute,
the Court held that the plaintiff had failed to show his injury
was concrete.15 The Court remanded the case and instructed the
lower court to consider the falsehoods’ “degree of risk” of “real
harm” to the plaintiff.16 In the years since, lower courts have
relied on Spokeo to dismiss other statutorily authorized suits,
reasoning that a plaintiff asserting a privacy injury must also
demonstrate some additional, real-world harm.17
And in 2021’s TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez,18 the Court
further limited Congress’s ability to create legal rights
enforceable in federal court. TransUnion, one of the three major
credit-reporting companies, falsely labeled Sergio Ramirez a
“potential terrorist.”19 The Court held that class members who
had this false designation disseminated to potential employers

9. 568 U.S. 398 (2013).
10. Id. at 410.
11. Id. at 416.
12. See, e.g., McMorris v. Carlos Lopez & Assocs., 995 F.3d 295, 303–05
(2d Cir. 2021).
13. 578 U.S. 330 (2016).
14. Id. at 333.
15. Id. at 342–43.
16. See id. at 341–43.
17. See, e.g., Hancock v. Urban Outfitters, Inc., 830 F.3d 511, 515 (D.C.
Cir. 2016).
18. 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021).
19.
Id. at 2209.
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and lenders did have a sufficiently concrete injury, but those
who couldn’t prove third-party dissemination did not.20
These three decisions create several problems that limit
actionable privacy injuries. This Article focuses on two of them.
First, the Supreme Court has failed to provide lower courts,
litigants, legislatures, and other interested parties with a
coherent way to discern which intangible injuries satisfy the
injury in fact requirements and which do not.21 Second, courts
have failed to provide a persuasive justification for the
now-routine practice of nullifying the product of political
consensus.22
The first problem—the line-drawing problem—manifests in
all informational-injury cases.23 Most agree that some
informational practices are per se injurious and therefore
require nothing else from the plaintiff. For example, the
Supreme Court has previously held that the unauthorized
interception and dissemination of a phone conversation sufficed
for Article III purposes.24 But other informational practices
require more; for example, the plaintiff in Spokeo needed to
show how dissemination of false information about him
threatened his real-world interests.25
Companies that routinely engage in abusive informational
practices have seized on this uncertainty. For example, in
various courts and cases over the past four years, Facebook has
argued that courts lack jurisdiction over all privacy disputes
except when the plaintiff shows that the company disseminated
the plaintiff’s information to third parties, without the plaintiff’s
terms-of-service consent, and in a way that specifically and
20. Id. at 2212–13.
21. See Elizabeth C. Pritzker, Making the Intangible Concrete: Litigating
Intangible Privacy Harms in a Post-Spokeo World, 26 COMPETITION 1, 5–15
(2017) (explaining circuit splits on this question).
22. See Peter Ormerod, Privacy Injuries and Article III Concreteness, 48
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 133, 169 (2020) [hereinafter Ormerod, Privacy Injuries]
(“However, a court should give effect to Congress’s policy choices after
concluding that the court is ill-suited for and has no justification for
second-guessing the byproduct of the political process.”).
23. See Mark Bernstein, Standing Here or There?, 106 ILL. BAR J. 38, 40
(2018).
24. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 525, 533 (2001).
25. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 342 (2016) (stating that it
was not enough for the plaintiff to show a bare procedural violation).
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individually identified the plaintiff.26 It’s little surprise that this
interpretation immunizes Facebook from nearly every
conceivable privacy harm.
The second problem—the lack of a justification for
counter-majoritarian
Article
III
standing—is
more
fundamental. Absent a rationale for courts’ practice of
substituting their judgment for the political process,
legislatures and litigants lack guidance about how to make
privacy harms actionable in federal court. As empty-handed
legislatures consider new privacy protections, the Court’s
restrictive interpretation of Article III suggests that abusive
informational practices are incapable of individual
enforcement—meaning that only a centralized regulator can
vindicate individuals’ privacy interests.27
Other scholars have noted the radical implications of the
Court’s recent Article III jurisprudence.28 But others’ proposed
solutions fall short of solving these two problems. This Article
fills that void by proposing a solution to the line-drawing and
counter-majoritarian problems. To achieve this end, it builds on

26. See Oral Argument at 6:20, Patel v. Facebook, 932 F.3d 1264 (9th Cir.
2019) (No. 18-15982), https://perma.cc/GQ66-FQJ4 (arguing that “invasion of
privacy” injuries require “misuse” or disclosure to a third party);
Defendant-Appellee Facebook, Inc.’s Supplemental Brief Re: Spokeo, Inc. v.
Robins at 11, Campbell v. Facebook, Inc., 951 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2020) (No.
17-16873) (arguing that the dissemination of “anonymized and aggregated”
data cannot constitute an injury in fact); Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, In
re Facebook, Inc., Consumer Priv. User Profile Litig., 402 F. Supp. 3d 767 (N.D.
Cal. 2019) (No. 18-md-02843-VC) (“Once you have that consent, which is plain
and clear and we believe as a matter of law enforceable against the plaintiffs,
a person cannot be injured in fact by the sharing of information when the
person consented to that very sharing of information.”); Appellee’s Brief at
21– 24, In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litig., 956 F.3d 589 (9th Cir.
2020) (arguing that plaintiffs lacked an Article III privacy injury because they
didn’t allege an unauthorized dissemination of personally identifiable
information to third parties); Brief for Amici Curiae eBay, Inc., Facebook, Inc.,
Google LLC, et al. at 12–17, TransUnion v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 972 (2021) (No.
20-297) (urging the Supreme Court to interpret Article III to broadly prohibit
statutory damages in class actions).
27. See Wu, supra note 7, at 457–61 (explaining why an overly expansive
standing inquiry is particularly problematic in the context of suits against
private companies).
28. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 23, at 40.
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Helen Nissenbaum’s contextual integrity framework.29 Briefly,
contextual integrity observes that privacy interests are context
specific, and it posits that privacy violations are the byproduct
of practices that breach entrenched informational norms.30
Constructing a legal framework based on contextual
integrity helps solve both of the problems with the Court’s
recent injury in fact decisions. First, informational norms—and
people’s
expectations
about
injurious
informational
practices— supply courts with a mechanism for distinguishing
between informational harms that create an Article III injury
and those that do not.31 Second, informational norms provide
judges with a persuasive justification for dismissing cases that
involve excessively abstract harms.32
The legal framework supplies answers to the question of
which statutes and which circumstances create actionable
privacy injuries. Illustrations of the framework’s utility cover
three distinct kinds of authority: first, existing privately
enforceable provisions, including those from the Wiretap Act,33
the Video Privacy Protection Act,34 the Stored Communications
Act,35 the Fair Credit Reporting Act,36 the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act,37 Illinois’s Biometric Information Privacy Act,38
and others; second, authorities that are not currently privately
enforceable, like the Health Insurance Portability and

29. See generally HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY,
POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE (2009); see also infra Part IV.
30. See Helen Nissenbaum, A Contextual Approach to Privacy Online, 140
DAEDALUS 32, 33 (2011) (explaining privacy “in terms of expected flows of
personal information, modeled with the construct of context-relative
informational norms” and stating that “violations of these norms, however,
often result in protest and complaint”).
31.
See Ormerod, Privacy Injuries, supra note 22, at 176 (stating that the
Supreme Court seems to want something more than mere information
collection, like humiliation, mental anguish, or identity theft).
32. See id. at 190 (“The informational-injury framework also helps reveal
the Court’s inability to explain why some informational injuries are concrete
and why others are not.”).
33. 18 U.S.C. § 2511.
34. 18 U.S.C. § 2710.
35. 18 U.S.C. § 121.
36. 15 U.S.C. § 1681.
37. 47 U.S.C. § 227.
38. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/1 (2008).
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Accountability Act39 and the California Consumer Privacy Act;40
and third, proposed authorities at both the federal and state
levels.41
It’s too late to undo all of the havoc wrought by the Court’s
constitutional standing cases. But it isn’t too late to adopt a
framework that cabins the doctrine’s most extreme implications
and provides courts with a consistent and coherent way to
protect privacy.
This Article has five parts. Part I reviews the history of
Article III standing and categorizes the Court’s recent
informational-injury cases. Part II delves into the specifics of
Clapper, Spokeo, and TransUnion. It diagnoses and describes
the line-drawing and counter-majoritarian problems in detail
and explains why other solutions fall short. Part III provides a
brief primer on contextual integrity. Part IV first constructs the
legal framework based on contextual integrity and then
illustrates how to use the framework. Part V justifies the
specifics—highlighting the legal framework’s virtues and
responding to objections.
I.

ARTICLE III STANDING: PAST AND PRESENT

The history of Article III standing is complex and contested.
This Part briefly traces the origins of modern standing doctrine
and then surveys the Supreme Court’s contemporary
approaches to informational injuries.
A.

A Brief History of Article III Standing

Article III provides that the “judicial Power of the United
States’ . . . extends only to Cases and Controversies.”42
According to the Supreme Court, “[s]tanding to sue is a doctrine
rooted in the traditional understanding of a case or
controversy,”43 and the doctrine of standing “limits the category
of litigants empowered to maintain a lawsuit in federal court to
39. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
40. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798 (West 2018).
41. See, e.g., S. Res. 2968, 116th Cong. (2020); S.B. 5642, § 1102(b), 243
Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019).
42. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 2.
43. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016).
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seek redress for a legal wrong.”44 Constitutional standing today
has three components: A “plaintiff must have (1) suffered an
injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged
conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed
by a favorable judicial decision.”45
Legal scholars have contested the accuracy of the Court’s
sweeping generalizations that standing to sue is historically
grounded.46 Standing doctrine’s opponents have argued that
“[t]here was no doctrine of standing prior to the middle of the
twentieth century.”47 According to this view, the form of the
plaintiff’s action was historically the dispositive issue for
justiciability—a court asked “whether the matter before it fit
one of the recognized forms of action.”48
Other scholars have disagreed. Standing doctrine’s
proponents contend that history may not compel the contours of
modern standing doctrine, but it also doesn’t conclusively defeat
it.49 American courts in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
did not use the term “standing,” but nonetheless “were well
aware of the need for proper parties.”50
Central to the dispute is whether nineteenth century courts
rooted standing in the federal Constitution. The opponents have
argued that “for the first 150 years of the Republic—the
Framers, the first Congresses, and the Court were oblivious to
the modern conception . . . that standing is a component of the
constitutional phrase ‘cases or controversies,’”51 and that the
first reference to “standing” as an Article III limitation dates to

44. Id. (citing Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation
of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 473 (1982)).
45. Id. (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)).
46. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 5, at 166 (“It has no support in the text
or history of Article III. It is essentially an invention of federal judges, and
recent ones at that.”).
47. John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent
Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1009
(2002).
48. Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of
Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1395 (1988).
49. See Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing
Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689, 691 (2004).
50. Id.
51. Winter, supra note 48, at 1374.
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a 1944 Supreme Court decision.52 The proponents see the
history differently: “While the nineteenth-century Court did not
always make the constitutional nature of its concerns as clear
as the twentieth-century Court has, . . . the Supreme Court did
see some standing issues as constitutional, expressing
particular concerns about unwarranted judicial interference
with the federal and state political branches.”53
Everyone agrees, however, that the genesis of the Court’s
current approach to Article III standing traces to the middle of
the twentieth century.54 Flast v. Cohen,55 in 1968, represents
standing skeptics’ high-water mark. Flast concerned taxpayer
standing in the context of an alleged Establishment Clause
violation.56 Chief Justice Earl Warren’s opinion allowed the suit
to proceed and created the “nexus test.”57 The nexus test
requires “a logical nexus between the status asserted and the
claim sought to be adjudicated.”58 Justice William O. Douglas’s
concurrence foreshadowed that the nexus test would not prove
“durable.”59
Two years later, Justice Douglas wrote for a unanimous
court that “[t]he first question is whether the plaintiff alleges
that the challenged action has caused him injury in fact,
economic or otherwise.”60 “Unlike the Flast ‘nexus,’ the ‘injury
in fact’ criterion proved both hardy and luxuriant.”61 But even
after the term “injury in fact” arrived, the strictures of
constitutionally grounded standing remained opaque. Some
“prudential” limitations on standing could be discarded by

52. Sunstein, supra note 5, at 169.
53. Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 49, at 713.
54. See, e.g., Freejohn & Kramer, supra note 47, at 1009.
55. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
56. See id. at 88.
57. Id. at 102.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 107 (Douglas, J., concurring).
60. Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152
(1970).
61. Seth F. Kreimer, “Spooky Action at a Distance”: Intangible Injury in
Fact in the Information Age, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 745, 749 (2016).
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either Congress or the Court, and a justification for standing’s
“irreducible” constitutional “core” proved elusive.62
The Supreme Court’s 1992 decision in Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife63 spawned the modern approach to Article III
standing.64 Lujan involved a suit filed under the citizen-suit
provision of the Endangered Species Act (ESA),65 which
authorized “any person” to “commence a civil suit on his own
behalf to enjoin any person” allegedly violating the ESA.66
Wildlife conservation groups brought suit to enjoin a revised
regulation that limited the geographic scope of one of the ESA’s
provisions.67 Justice Antonin Scalia’s majority opinion held that
the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing because they had not
suffered an “injury in fact.”68
Lujan defines the injury in fact requirement as “an invasion
of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and
particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical.”69 The opinion also supplies a justification for the
constitutional basis for standing doctrine.70 Flast v. Cohen had
rejected the suggestion that standing preserved the separation
of powers: “The question whether a particular person is a proper
party to maintain the action does not, by its own force, raise
separation of powers problems related to the improper judicial
62. See Ormerod, Privacy Injuries, supra note 22, at 140 (“Prudential
limitations on standing were subject to removal by the Court or Congress,
whereas ‘the constitutional core of standing . . . [was] a minimum requirement
of injury in fact which not even Congress can eliminate.’”).
63. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
64. See John H. Hykes III, Standing, Statutory Violations, and Concrete
Injury in Federal Consumer Financial Protection Statutes After Spokeo, Inc. v.
Robins, 21 N.C. BANKING INST. 227, 231–22 (2017) (“The Supreme Court
acknowledged in Lujan that Congress can elevate to the status of legally
cognizable concrete injuries those intangible injuries which otherwise would
be constitutionally inadequate.”).
65. Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973).
66. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g).
67. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 558–59.
68. Id. at 577.
69. Id. at 560 (internal quotation marks omitted).
70. See Jonathan Poisner, Environmental Values and Judicial Review
After Lujan: Two Critiques of the Separation of Powers Theory of Standing, 18
ECOLOGY L.Q. 335, 350–52 (1991) (stating that Lujan confirmed the
inevitability of the proof requirement as part of the separation of powers
theory of standing).

MAKING PRIVACY INJURIES CONCRETE

113

interference in areas committed to other branches of the Federal
Government.”71 Having contested Flast’s treatment of the
separation of powers in a law review article about a decade
earlier,72 Justice Scalia’s Lujan opinion enshrines the
separation of powers as the justification for constitutional limits
on standing:
To permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public
interest in executive officers’ compliance with the law into an
“individual right” vindicable in the courts is to permit
Congress to transfer from the President to the courts the
Chief Executive’s most important constitutional duty, to
“take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”73

The pace of the Supreme Court’s standing cases accelerated
after Lujan. At the Roberts Court, scarcely a year has passed in
the last decade without one or more major decisions premised
on Article III standing.74
B.

Injury in Fact and Information After Lujan

Lujan’s definition of the injury in fact requirement poses
particular difficulties for injuries that involve information.
Information is intangible and non-rivalrous, characteristics that
tend to vex courts evaluating whether an informational injury
is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent.75
Despite these inherent difficulties, even after Lujan there
are four distinct bare informational harms that can create a
justiciable Article III injury: injuries arising from the wrongful
collection of information, injuries arising from the wrongful use
71. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 100 (1968).
72. See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element
of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 890–93 (1983)
(discussing the Flast holding and impact).
73. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577.
74. See Ormerod, Privacy Injuries, supra note 22, at 136 (listing such
cases decided before or during October Term 2020: Carney v. Adams, 141 S.
Ct. 493 (2020); Trump v. New York, 141 S. Ct. 530 (2020); Uzuegbunam v.
Preczewski, 141 S. Ct. 792 (2021); California v. Texas, 141 S. Ct. 2104 (2021);
TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021)).
75. See Kreimer, supra note 61, at 752–54 (“Information is intangible.
Information is often difficult to combine to particular recipients. And in the
age of the Internet, information is immediately available without constraint of
time or space.”).
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of information, injuries arising from the wrongful dissemination
of information, and injuries arising from the wrongful
withholding of information.76 To be clear, not all informational
injuries necessarily implicate privacy concerns. But most—and
perhaps all—privacy violations involve an informational
injury.77
The first informational injury is information collection. In
an information collection case, a statute prohibits the collection
of certain information but an entity collects covered information
anyway in violation of the statute.78 In such a case, the person
to whom the information relates (the data subject) has suffered
an information collection injury.79
The Court has held that some information collection
injuries are sufficiently concrete for Article III purposes. For
example, in 2001’s Bartnicki v. Vopper,80 an unidentified person
intercepted and recorded a phone conversation between a
union’s president and the union’s negotiator.81 A radio show
later broadcast the recording, and the conversation participants
sought statutory damages under the federal Wiretap Act and its
state equivalents.82 In relevant part, the Wiretap Act prohibits
“intentionally intercept[ing] . . . any wire, oral, or electronic
communication.”83
All nine Justices agreed that both the interception of the
conversation and its dissemination were concrete injuries84
(Part I.B.3 revisits Bartnicki as an information dissemination
case). A six-Justice majority held that enforcing the Wiretap
Act’s prohibition in this case violated the First Amendment’s
Free Speech Clause.85 But the majority expressly acknowledged
76. See Ormerod, Privacy Injuries, supra note 22, at 133.
77. See id. at 138 (“Most privacy injuries are informational in nature.”).
78. Id. at 143.
79. See id. (summarizing such Supreme Court cases).
80. 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
81. Id. at 518–19.
82. Id.
83. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a).
84. See Ormerod, Privacy Injuries, supra note 22, at 143 (discussing
Bartnicki).
85. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 525 (“The only question is whether the
application of these statutes in such circumstances violates the First
Amendment.”).
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two things—first, that the defendants had violated the statute
when they disseminated the recording; and second, that the
Court had jurisdiction to consider the merits of enforcing the
statute against the defendants.86 Any adjudication on the merits
presupposes the existence of the jurisdictional requirement of
Article III standing.87 Chief Justice William Rehnquist’s
dissenting opinion agreed that the plaintiffs suffered an injury
but disagreed that the statutes violated the First Amendment.88
The second informational injury is information use.
Information use injuries encompass several different
informational practices.89 What they have in common is that a
defendant uses a data subject’s information in an injurious way
that does not involve the dissemination of that information.90 To
be sure, uses and disclosures often go hand-in-hand because
dissemination is one common way to use information.91 But
disseminations are distinct informational injuries and are
addressed next.
Many federal laws limit the permissible uses of certain
types of information. For example, the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) gives individuals
the right “to request that the covered entity restrict . . . uses or
disclosures of protected health information about the
individual.”92 Similarly, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act’s
(GLBA)93 Privacy Rule limits the “redisclosure and reuse” of
some nonpublic personal information.94
To date, the Supreme Court has not explicitly addressed
when a bare information use injury suffices for Article III
purposes. Neither HIPAA nor GLBA are privately enforceable,

86. Id. at 525.
87. See, e.g., Frederiksen v. City of Lockport, 384 F.3d 437, 438 (7th Cir.
2004) (“A suit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction cannot also be dismissed ‘with
prejudice’; that’s a disposition on the merits, which only a court with
jurisdiction may render.”).
88. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 553 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
89. See Ormerod, Privacy Injuries, supra note 22, at 144.
90. See id. (describing intellectual property law and prohibitions on
discrimination as information use restrictions).
91. See id. at 147.
92. 45 C.F.R. § 164.522(a)(1)(i)(A).
93. Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
94. 12 C.F.R. § 1016.11.
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so violations of those authorities’ use limitations don’t squarely
present cases that implicate Article III standing.95 While the
Fair Credit Reporting Act is privately enforceable and does
include information use or purpose limitations, those
restrictions are best understood as restrictions on
dissemination.96 Nevertheless, the Court has routinely decided
cases that presuppose the sufficiency of information use
injuries.97
Despite the Court’s silence on this issue, there are good
reasons to believe that at least some information uses are
inherently injurious. Examples discussed later in Part IV.B
include facial recognition harms, data protection law’s purpose
restrictions, and prohibitions on spam telephone calls.
The
third
informational
injury
is
information
dissemination. In a dissemination case, a statute prohibits the
dissemination of information, and the defendant flouts the
proscription to the detriment of the data subject, the plaintiff.98
The Court has previously recognized the Article III sufficiency
of some information dissemination injuries. Bartnicki is an
obvious example.99 There, the defendants were those who
broadcast the phone conversation recording, and the Court held
that “the disclosure of the contents of the intercepted
conversations . . . violated
the
federal
and
state
statutes . . . [and the] petitioners are thus entitled to recover
damages from each of the respondents.”100 The only remaining
question, the Court said, was “whether the application of these
statutes in such circumstances violates the First
Amendment.”101

95. See R. Bradley McMahon, After Billions Spent to Comply with HIPAA
and GLBA Privacy Provisions, Why Is Identity Theft the Most Prevalent Crime
in America?, 49 VILL. L. REV. 625, 643, 650 (2004) (stating that these laws do
not provide individuals with private causes of action).
96. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(3) (listing permissible uses of the information).
97. See, e.g., Facebook v. Duguid, 141 S. Ct. 1163, 1168 (2021) (resolving
the merits of a Telephone Consumer Protection Act statutory construction
case).
98. See Ormerod, Privacy Injuries, supra note 22, at 148–49 (discussing
cases involving information dissemination).
99. See id. at 148.
100. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 525 (2001).
101. Id.
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Doe v. Chao,102 in 2004, holds the same. There, a plaintiff
sued the U.S. Department of Labor for disclosing his Social
Security number in violation of the Privacy Act.103 A six-Justice
majority ruled against Doe on the merits of his statutory claim,
but nonetheless held that he had suffered an injury in fact.104
The statute’s reference to “‘adverse effect’ acts as a term of art
identifying a potential plaintiff who satisfies the injury-in-fact
and causation requirements of Article III standing, and who
may consequently bring a civil action without suffering
dismissal for want of standing to sue.”105 The dissent agreed on
the standing issue: “Doe has standing to sue, the Court agrees,
based on allegations that he was ‘torn . . . all to pieces’ and
‘greatly concerned and worried’ because of the disclosure of his
Social Security number and its potentially ‘devastating’
consequences.”106
The final type of informational harm is information
withholding. In an information withholding case, a statute
provides a plaintiff with a legal right to access certain
information.107 When the entity that controls the
information—the defendant—refuses to disclose it, the plaintiff
has suffered an information withholding injury.108
The Supreme Court has held that an information
withholding injury suffices for Article III. In 1998’s Federal
Election Commission v. Akins,109 the Federal Election
Commission (FEC) had determined that the American Israel
Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) was not a “political
committee” as that term is defined in the Federal Election
Campaign Act (FECA).110 That determination exempted AIPAC
from needing to disclose information about its membership,
contributions, and expenditures.111 A group of voters eventually
brought suit in federal court under a provision of the statute
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

540 U.S. 614 (2004).
Id. at 616–17.
Id. at 624.
Id.
Id. at 641 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (cleaned up).
Ormerod, Privacy Injuries, supra note 22, at 135.
See id. at 137.
524 U.S. 11 (1998).
2 U.S.C. § 431(4)(A); Akins, 524 U.S. at 13.
Akins, 524 U.S. at 13–14.
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that permitted “[a]ny party aggrieved” to seek judicial review of
an FEC decision to dismiss a complaint.112 The FEC sought to
dismiss the suit on standing grounds.113
The Court held that the informational injury the plaintiffs
suffered was sufficient for Article III: “The ‘injury in fact’ that
respondents have suffered consists of their inability to obtain
information . . . that, on respondents’ view of the law, the
statute requires AIPAC make public.”114 The majority also
explained that past cases had “held that a plaintiff suffers an
‘injury in fact’ when the plaintiff fails to obtain information
which must be publicly disclosed pursuant to a statute.”115
Akins is interesting because the plaintiffs faced two hurdles
that many privacy plaintiffs will not—particularization
concerns and a governmental defendant.116 First, with respect
to particularization, Justice Scalia’s dissent argued that the
voters had suffered only a generalized grievance: “[T]he injury
or deprivation is not only widely shared but it is
undifferentiated. . . . [The] harm caused to Mr. Akins by the
allegedly unlawful failure to enforce FECA is precisely the same
as the harm caused to everyone else: unavailability of a
description of AIPAC’s activities.”117
Second, the separation of powers justification for Article III
standing is at its zenith when a plaintiff challenges the
Executive Branch’s interpretation of the law.118 And as Lujan
112. See 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(8)(A).
113. Akins, 524 U.S. at 18.
114. Id. at 21. Other cases have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g.,
Pub. Citizen v. DOJ, 491 U.S. 440, 449 (1989).
115. Akins, 524 U.S. at 21 (citing Pub. Citizen v. DOJ, 491 U.S. 440, 449
(1989); Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373–74 (1982)). Lower
courts have held that some statutory schemes don’t supply an injury in fact for
alleged information withholding injuries. See, e.g., Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v.
Presidential Advisory Comm’n on Election Integrity, 878 F.3d 371, 378 (D.C.
Cir. 2017) (rejecting standing for an information withholding injury because
the plaintiff did not suffer the type of harm that the statute sought to prevent).
116.
See Akins, 524 U.S. at 29–30 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The provision
of law at issue in this case is an extraordinary one, conferring upon a private
person the ability to bring an Executive agency into court to compel its
enforcement of the law against a third party.”).
117. Id. at 35–36 (emphasis omitted).
118. See, e.g., id. at 36 (“A system in which the citizenry at large could sue
to compel Executive compliance with the law would be a system in which the
courts, rather than the President, are given the primary responsibility to ‘take
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shows us, these two hurdles are intimately connected—Lujan
and Akins share in common a concern about “[t]he public’s
nonconcrete interest in the proper administration of the
laws.”119
Privacy cases involving withholding injuries are unlikely to
create similar problems.120 Your right to access information
about yourself is inherently particularized in a way that the
right in Akins was not. And many—perhaps most—information
access rights that implicate privacy concerns apply to
private-sector actors.121 To be sure, the Court recently held that
a company’s violation of a statute that requires information
production only sometimes supplies the plaintiff with a
sufficiently concrete injury.122 But even that case confirms that
“formatting errors” that violate an information production
requirement can suffice for Article III standing.123
***
This Part has shown that the history of Article III standing
is opaque but the Court’s modern approach recognizes that at
least some bare informational harms are inherently injurious.
The next Part describes privacy’s most recent Article III
setbacks at the Supreme Court.
II.

PRIVACY’S ARTICLE III PROBLEMS

In the past decade, the Supreme Court decided three Article
III standing cases that have ominous implications for privacy.
This Part first surveys these decisions; it then synthesizes the

Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3)).
For more on this, see infra Part II.B.2.
119. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in part).
120. The California Consumer Privacy Act, for example, includes several
access provisions. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100(a), 1798.110(a) (permitting
access to information from business that collect personal information); id.
§ 1798.115(a) (permitting access to information from businesses that sell or
disclose personal information).
121. See, e.g., id. §§ 1798.100(a), 1798.110(a). For more on this, see infra
Part IV.B.
122. See TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2213–14 (2021).
123. See id. at 2214 (“As for the claims pertaining to the format of
TransUnion’s mailings, none of the 8,185 class members other than the named
plaintiff Ramirez suffered a concrete harm.” (emphasis added)).
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problems for privacy that they signal and evaluates other
attempts to resolve them.
A.

Recent Cases

In recent years, the Supreme Court’s Article III standing
jurisprudence has been extraordinarily active.124 This section
focuses on three cases that highlight some significant problems
for privacy standing—2013’s Clapper v. Amnesty International
USA, 2016’s Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, and 2021’s TransUnion LLC
v. Ramirez.
1.

Clapper v. Amnesty International USA (2013)

The plaintiffs—attorneys, journalists, and human-rights
activists—challenged the constitutionality of a recently enacted
statute that expanded the government’s foreign surveillance
authority.125 The plaintiffs believed that some of the people with
whom they communicated would be targeted by the
government’s surveillance, and hence that the plaintiffs’
communications would be intercepted in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.126 Clapper is thus an information collection case:
The plaintiffs argued that the government’s collection of their
communications—in
violation
of
the
Fourth
Amendment—constituted their injury in fact.127
The plaintiffs’ theories of harm fell into two categories.
First, future harms: they argued there was “an objectively
reasonable likelihood that their communications will be
acquired under [the statute] at some point in the future.”128
Second, mitigation harms: they argued that “the threat of
surveillance will compel them to travel abroad in order to have
in-person conversations” and that these “costly and burdensome
measures” to avoid surveillance constituted an ongoing present
injury.129

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

See Ormerod, Privacy Injuries, supra note 22, at 136.
See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 406 (2013).
Id. at 406–07.
See id. at 401.
Id.
Id. at 407.
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The Second Circuit sided with the plaintiffs on both
theories. It held that the plaintiffs had standing because there
was an objectively reasonable likelihood that their
communications would be intercepted130 and because they were
suffering ongoing “present injuries in fact—economic and
professional harms—stemming from a reasonable fear of future
harmful government conduct.”131
The Supreme Court reversed on both future injuries and
mitigation harms.132 Justice Samuel Alito’s opinion for the 5–4
majority rejected the Second Circuit’s future injury
standard—“an objectively reasonable likelihood”—and instead
offered an exceedingly stringent one: The “threatened injury
must be certainly impending to constitute injury in fact.”133 And
the plaintiffs fell short of that standard because their
allegations rested on a “highly speculative . . . chain of
contingencies.”134 The Court added that the plaintiffs’
allegations were particularly speculative because they
“require[d] guesswork as to how independent decisionmakers
will exercise their judgment.”135
In dissent, Justice Stephen Breyer identified several past
decisions in which the Court used a less demanding standard to
conclude that a plaintiff alleging future harm had standing.136
In footnote five of the majority opinion, Justice Alito responded:
Our cases do not uniformly require plaintiffs to demonstrate
that it is literally certain that the harms they identify will
come about. In some instances, we have found standing
based on a “substantial risk” that the harm will occur, which
may prompt plaintiffs to reasonably incur costs to mitigate
or avoid that harm.137

130. See id. (citing Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 133–34,
139 (2d Cir. 2011)).
131. Id. (quoting Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 138 (2d Cir.
2011) (emphasis omitted)).
132. Id. at 422.
133. Id. at 409 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)).
134. Id. at 410.
135. Id. at 413.
136. See id. at 432–33 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (listing cases).
137. Id. at 414 n.5.
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Footnote five also adds that “to the extent that the
‘substantial risk’ standard is relevant and distinct from the
‘certainly impending’ requirement, [the plaintiffs] fall short of
even that standard, in light of the attenuated chain of inferences
necessary to find harm.”138
As one scholar has noted, “Footnote five, in other words,
appeared to be an alternative holding in Clapper—namely, that
even under the less onerous ‘substantial risk’ standard, the
plaintiffs in that case had failed to satisfy their burden.”139
Sixteenth months after Clapper, a unanimous Court decided a
different future-injury standing case in which Justice Clarence
Thomas’s majority opinion applied the “substantial risk”
standard—all but ignoring Clapper’s “certainly impending”
requirement.140
The Clapper majority also held that the plaintiffs’ present
injury claims—their mitigation harms—did not supply an
Article III injury in fact.141 The Court held that the mitigation
efforts could not “manufacture standing merely by inflicting
harm on themselves based on their fears of a hypothetical future
harm that is not certainly impending.”142 In other words, the
Court held that mitigation harms are never sufficient for an
injury in fact—they are beside the point, a null set.143 Mitigation
harms only supply standing when they are taken in response to
a certainly impending future injury, but a certainly impending
injury is, alone, sufficient for standing.144 In short, there are no
cases in which mitigation changes the result. Either a harm is
certainly impending (yes standing) or it’s not (no standing), and
mitigation efforts don’t matter in either case.

138. Id.
139. Marty Lederman, Commentary: Susan B. Anthony List, Clapper
Footnote 5, and the State of Article III Standing Doctrine, SCOTUSBLOG (June
17, 2014, 4:34 PM), https://perma.cc/G4Q9-6MB2.
140. See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 158, 164–67
(2014).
141. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 418 (2013).
142. Id. at 416.
143. See id. at 417.
144. See id. at 416.
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Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins (2016)

The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) seeks to “ensure fair
and accurate credit reporting” by “regulat[ing] the creation and
the use of consumer reports by consumer reporting agencies.”145
The statute is privately enforceable, providing that “‘any person
who willfully fails to comply with any requirement of the Act
with respect to any individual is liable to that individual’ for,
among other things, either ‘actual damages’ or statutory
damages of $100 to $1,000 per violation, costs of the action and
attorney’s fees, and possibly punitive damages.”146
Robins, the plaintiff, filed an FCRA suit against Spokeo, a
company that operates a “people search engine.”147 The
company’s search results for Robins reported that “he is
married, has children, is in his 50’s, has a job, is relatively
affluent, and holds a graduate degree.”148 According to Robins,
all of that information was false.149 Spokeo is thus an
information dissemination case: Robins argued that Spokeo
disseminated false information about him in violation of the
statute and in a way that posed a risk to his employment
prospects.150
In 2010, Robins instituted a putative class action, alleging
that Spokeo willfully failed to comply with the FCRA.151 The
district court granted Spokeo’s motion to dismiss, holding that
Robins had failed to “properly plead” an Article III injury in
fact.152 The Ninth Circuit reversed.153 Noting that “the violation
of a statutory right is usually a sufficient injury in fact to confer
standing,” the Ninth Circuit held that Robins alleged a
sufficient injury because he alleged that “Spokeo violated his
statutory rights, not just the statutory rights of other people,”

145. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 334 (2016) (quoting 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681(a)) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
146. Id. at 335 (internal quotation marks, footnotes, and brackets omitted).
147. Id. at 333.
148. Id. at 336.
149. Id.
150. See id. at 336, 350.
151. Id. at 336.
152. Id. at 337.
153. Id.
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and because his “personal interests in the handling of his credit
information are individualized rather than collective.”154
In a 6–2 opinion by Justice Alito, the Court vacated and
remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit.155 The majority
explained that remand was necessary because the “Ninth
Circuit’s analysis focused on the second characteristic
(particularity), but it overlooked the first (concreteness).”156 The
majority’s discussion of Article III concreteness is convoluted,
touching on at least four distinct subjects—an injury’s
tangibility, the role of history and Congress, procedural versus
substantive rights, and the so-called “risk of real harm.”157
According to the majority, Congress’s “role in identifying and
elevating intangible harms does not mean that a plaintiff
automatically satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement whenever
a statute grants a person a statutory right and purports to
authorize that person to sue to vindicate that right.”158
Here, the Court held, Robins had merely alleged a
“deprivation of a procedural right without [a] concrete
interest . . . affected by the deprivation.”159 The Court
acknowledged that, through the FCRA, “Congress plainly
sought to curb the dissemination of false information by
adopting procedures designed to decrease that risk,” but
nonetheless held that “not all inaccuracies cause harm or
present any material risk of harm.”160 For example, the Court
said, it is “difficult to imagine how the dissemination of an
incorrect zip code, without more, could work any concrete
harm.”161

154. Robins v. Spokeo, Inc. (Robins I), 742 F.3d 409, 413 (9th Cir. 2014)
(emphasis omitted).
155. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 343 (2016).
156. Id. at 334.
157. See id. at 339–43; see also Ormerod, Privacy Injuries, supra note 22,
15157 (discussing the Court’s analysis in Spokeo).
158. Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 341.
159. Id. at 346–47 (quoting Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488,
496 (2009)).
160. Id. at 342.
161. Id.
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TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez (2021)

TransUnion is one of the three major credit-reporting
companies in the United States.162 Beginning in 2002,
TransUnion began cross-referencing the first and last names of
credit-check subjects against the U.S. Treasury Department’s
Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) list.163 The OFAC list
includes terrorists, drug traffickers, and other serious criminals
who threaten America’s national security and with whom it is
generally unlawful to transact business.164 Despite producing
thousands of false positives and spawning litigation that
TransUnion lost, TransUnion continued to cross-reference only
subjects’ first and last names for nearly a decade.165
In 2011, Sergio Ramirez sought to purchase a car, and the
ensuing credit check reported that he was a “potential match”
for an individual on the OFAC list.166 Ramirez requested his
credit report from TransUnion, and the company sent him two
mailings—the first included his credit report and a summary of
his rights under the FCRA but omitted the OFAC designation;
the second included the OFAC designation but omitted the
summary of rights.167
Ramirez sued TransUnion and alleged two types of
informational injuries: first, information dissemination—that
TransUnion’s dissemination of the false OFAC designation to
the car dealership violated the “maximum possible accuracy”
provision of the FCRA; second, information withholding—that
both of TransUnion’s mailings failed to comply with his
information access rights under the FCRA.168
The district court certified a class that included 8,185
people whom TransUnion had designated an OFAC match and
162. TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2201 (2021).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See id. at 2201–02; id. at 2215–16 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(summarizing Cortez v. Trans Union LLC, 617 F.3d 688 (3d Cir. 2010), where
Cortez’s name erroneously flagged as a match with a person named Cortes on
the OFAC list, yet TransUnion failed to remove the alert for years); Brief for
Respondent at 14, TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (No. 20-297) (“After July 26,
2011, TransUnion abandoned the procedures it defends before this Court.”).
166. TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2201.
167. Id. at 2201–02.
168. Id. at 2208.
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who had requested and received the same two mailings as
Ramirez.169 Of that class, the parties stipulated that 1,853
people had their credit reports disseminated by TransUnion to
potential creditors.170 Ramirez won at trial and the Ninth
Circuit mostly affirmed.171 In a 5–4 opinion by Justice
Kavanaugh, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the
Ninth Circuit’s decision, 172 and the opinion effects two pairs of
noteworthy developments.
The first pair concerns the specifics of Ramirez’s case. The
Court issued a split decision on both the dissemination and
withholding injuries. As to dissemination, the Court held that
only the 1,853 people who had their credit reports disseminated
to potential lenders had suffered a concrete Article III injury;
the other 6,332 had not.173 The Court explained that, as to the
1,853 people, “a person is injured when a defamatory statement
that would subject him to hatred, contempt, or ridicule is
published to the third party,” and that the “harm from being
labeled a ‘potential terrorist’ bears a close relationship to the
harm from being labeled a ‘terrorist.’”174 But the remaining
6,332 people lacked a concrete injury because their harm “is
roughly the same . . . as if someone wrote a defamatory letter
and then stored it in her desk drawer,” and a “letter that is not
sent does not harm anyone, no matter how insulting the letter
is.”175
As to the withholding injuries, the Court held that only
Ramirez had suffered a concrete injury and that the rest of the
class had not.176 The Court recast Ramirez’s withholding
injuries as mere formatting errors, and thus distinguished
Akins and Public Citizen v. DOJ.177 Because Ramirez had failed
to produce any “evidence that, other than Ramirez, a single
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. (citing Ramirez v. TransUnion LLC, 951 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir.
2020)).
172. Id. at 2214.
173. See id. at 220813.
174. Id. at 2208–09 (some internal quotations marks omitted).
175. Id. at 2210.
176. See id. at 2213–14.
177. 491 U.S. 440 (1989); see TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190,
2214 (2021).
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other class member so much as opened the dual mailings, nor
that they were confused, distressed, or relied on the information
in any way,” the absent class members lacked a sufficiently
concrete injury in fact.178 “Without any evidence of harm caused
by the format of the mailings,” the Court explained, “these are
bare procedural violations, divorced from any concrete harm.”179
In arriving at these holdings, however, the majority opinion
produced a pair of novel doctrinal evolutions. First, the Court
clarified its language from Clapper about future injuries.
Ramirez had argued that the 6,332 class members had also
suffered a future injury because their credit reports could have
been disseminated with the false designation at any time.180 The
Court rejected that argument and suggested that a risk of future
injury is never sufficient for Article III in any case where the
plaintiffs seek damages.181 In other words, only in cases for
injunctive relief—like Clapper—will a plaintiff satisfy Article III
for a harm not yet materialized.182
Second, the Court elaborated on the constitutional footing
of current standing doctrine. For the first time, the Court held
that even particularized injuries may violate both Article III and
Article II: “A regime where Congress could freely authorize
unharmed plaintiffs to sue defendants who violate federal law
not only would violate Article III but also would infringe on the
Executive Branch’s Article II authority.”183 Picking up a thread
from Justice Thomas’s Spokeo concurrence and from the
Ramirez oral argument, the Court held that “the choice of how
178. TransUnion LLC, 141 S. Ct. at 2213–14 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
179. Id. at 2213 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
180. Id. at 2212.
181. See id. at 2210–11 (“TransUnion advances a persuasive argument
that in a suit for damages, the mere risk of future harm, standing alone, cannot
qualify as a concrete harm—at least unless the exposure to the risk of future
harm itself causes a separate concrete harm.”).
182. See id. at 2211
If the risk of future harm materializes and the individual suffers a
concrete harm, then the harm itself, and not the pre-existing risk,
will constitute a basis for the person’s injury and for damages. If
the risk of future harm does not materialize, then the individual
cannot establish a concrete harm sufficient for standing, according
to TransUnion.
183. Id. at 2207 (emphasis omitted).
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to prioritize and how aggressively to pursue legal actions
against defendants who violate the law falls within the
discretion of the Executive Branch, not within the purview of
private plaintiffs (and their attorneys).”184
B.

Two Problems

These three cases signal several significant problems for
privacy standing. This section focuses on just two of them: the
Court’s failure to supply a line-drawing principle for its
informational-injury cases and the absence of a justification for
upsetting political consensus.
1.

No Line-Drawing Principle

Clapper, Spokeo, and TransUnion fail to supply a principle
for discerning when an informational injury is concrete,
particularized, and actual or imminent.
In Clapper, the Court held that the plaintiffs lacked proof
that the government would intercept their communications in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. Yet all nine Justices
seemed to agree that the plaintiffs would have had a concrete
(and actual) injury if they could have proven that their
communications
had
already
been
intercepted.185
“Notwithstanding the division as to whether plaintiffs had
adequately proven a threat of interception, both the majority
and dissent in Clapper appeared to accept that when the
government illicitly acquires private information, an actual
interception constitutes a justiciable ‘injury in fact.’”186 Justice
Breyer’s dissent stressed that “[n]o one here denies that the
Government’s interception of a private telephone or e-mail
conversation amounts to an injury that is ‘concrete and
particularized.’”187
But not all information collections create an injury in fact.
For example, the District of Columbia’s Use of Consumer

184. Id.
185. See supra notes 141–144 and accompanying text.
186. Kreimer, supra note 61, at 758.
187. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 423 (2013) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
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Identification Act (D.C. I.D. Act)188 provides that “no person
shall, as a condition of accepting a credit card as payment for a
sale of goods or services, request or record the address or
telephone number of a credit card holder on the credit card
transaction form.”189 Two D.C. consumers brought suit under
the law after their zip codes were requested and recorded at
point-of-sale retail transactions.190 The D.C. Circuit held that
the plaintiffs had failed to allege an Article III injury in fact: “If,
as the Supreme Court advised [in Spokeo], disclosure of an
incorrect zip code is not a concrete Article III injury, then even
less so is [the plaintiffs’] naked assertion that a zip code was
requested and recorded without any concrete consequence.”191
This example, in conjunction with Clapper, thus illustrates
that some informational practices are injurious enough for
Article III, but others are not. How is a plaintiff to know?
Clapper was an easy case on this front because it involved
communicative content—phone conversations and the bodies of
email messages.192 The Fourth Amendment (and several
statutes)193 have long singled out communicative content for
special protection,194 but it’s implausible that Article III’s case
or
controversy
requirement
observes
the
same
letter-versus-envelope distinction.
In other words, surely the collection of some information
other than communicative content suffices for Article III
injuries. Federal law, for example, prohibits health insurers

188. D.C. CODE § 47-3153 (2022).
189. Id. § 47-3153(a).
190. See Hancock v. Urb. Outfitters, Inc., 830 F.3d 511, 512 (D.C. Cir.
2016).
191. Id. at 514.
192. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
193. Compare Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 511 (prohibiting the “interception
and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic communications”), with Pen Register
Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3121 (prohibiting “pen register and trap and trace device
use”).
194. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (phone
conversations); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 46 (1967) (same); Ex parte
Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877) (physical letters in the mail); United States
v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 274 (6th Cir. 2010) (email content); Carpenter v.
United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220–22 (2018) (seeming to accept Warshak’s
conclusion about email content); id. at 2230 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (same).
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from collecting individuals’ genetic information.195 If that
statute included a private right of action and a plaintiff alleged
that an insurer violated the statute, would the plaintiff have an
Article III injury in fact? The Court’s cases don’t supply an
answer.
Spokeo raises the same problem in the context of
information dissemination. Recall that the Court held that it’s
“difficult to imagine how the dissemination of an incorrect zip
code, without more, could work any concrete harm.”196 But
surely some disseminations of information are injurious. After
all, on remand in Spokeo, the Ninth Circuit conducted a
concreteness analysis and concluded that Robins had alleged a
sufficient “risk of real harm” to constitute an injury in fact:
“Robins’s allegations relate facts that are substantially more
likely to harm his concrete interests than the Supreme Court’s
example of an incorrect zip code.”197 For example, the Ninth
Circuit said, “Robins alleged that he is out of work and looking
for a job, but that Spokeo’s inaccurate reports have caused
actual harm to his employment prospects by misrepresenting
facts that would be relevant to employers.”198 “Even if their
likelihood actually to harm Robins’s job search could be
debated,” the court concluded, “the inaccuracies alleged in this
case do not strike us as the sort of mere technical violations
which are too insignificant to present a sincere risk of harm to
the real-world interests that Congress chose to protect with the
FCRA.”199
Other courts have followed suit. The Eleventh Circuit and
the Ninth Circuit, for example, have both concluded that
disseminating information in violation of the Video Privacy
Protection Act200 is—without anything else—a concrete injury in
fact.201
Both TransUnion’s dissemination and withholding
conclusions compound this line-drawing problem. As the
195. See 29 U.S.C. § 1182(d).
196. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 342 (2016).
197. Robins v. Spokeo, Inc. (Robins II), 867 F.3d 1108, 1117 (9th Cir. 2017).
198. Id. (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
199. Id. (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
200. 18 U.S.C. § 2710.
201. See Perry v. Cable News Network, Inc., 854 F.3d 1336, 1341 (11th Cir.
2017); Eichenberger v. ESPN, Inc., 876 F.3d 979, 983 (9th Cir. 2017).
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TransUnion dissents explain, the distinctions the majority
draws between class members are illusory. On dissemination,
“TransUnion published [the false OFAC designation] to vendors
that printed and sent the mailings,” and in “the historical
context of libel, publication to even a single other party could be
enough to give rise to suit,” including “a telegraph company, an
attorney, or a stenographer who merely writes the information
down.”202 Further, “why is it so speculative that a company in
the business of selling credit reports to third parties will in fact
sell a credit report to a third party?”203 On withholding, “the
majority makes a set of curious assumptions,” like that “people
who specifically request a copy of their credit report may not
even ‘open[]’ the envelope,” and “people who learn that their
credit files label them potential terrorists would not ‘have tried
to correct’ the error.”204
In sum, the Court appears unlikely to slow its inexorable
campaign to sharply limit intangible injuries. Recent
informational standing cases have raised unanswered questions
about how courts should draw the line between sufficiently and
insufficiently concrete injuries. And even when everyone agrees
that an informational practice is injurious, the Court has
obfuscated the level of risk that is necessary to establish
standing. What makes some informational practices per se
injurious? How should lower courts (and legislatures) conduct
that analysis? And what level of risk suffices for per se injurious
practices?
2.

No Justification for Upsetting Political Consensus

The failure to supply a line-drawing principle is not,
however, the Court’s most fundamental error in its recent
standing decisions. The Court has also failed to justify its
practice of nullifying duly enacted private rights of action and
thereby overriding the byproduct of political consensus.
The only justification the Court has ever offered for
standing doctrine is the separation of powers.205 But upon closer
202. TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2223 (2021) (Thomas,
J., dissenting).
203. Id. at 2225 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 2225–26 (emphasis omitted) (alteration in original).
205. See, e.g., id. at 2207 (majority opinion).
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examination, the separation of powers justification has two
distinct constitutional footings—one grounded in Article II and
the other in Article III.206 In recent years, the Court has
expanded each, and the net result is an ever-shrinking list of
injuries that Congress can make privately enforceable and that
federal courts are allowed to entertain.
Start with Article II. Lujan held that Congress violated the
separation of powers when it attempted to use a citizen-suit
provision to handcuff the Executive Branch’s authority to
interpret a federal statute.207 After all, Justice Scalia wrote that
“convert[ing] the undifferentiated public interest in executive
officers’ compliance with the law into an ‘individual right’”
violated Article II’s Take Care Clause.208 In other words, Lujan’s
prohibition was relatively modest: do not infringe upon the
Executive Branch.
It’s also worth recognizing that Lujan’s concern is
minimized when Congress enacts a legal right that is
adequately particularized: it was the undifferentiated public
interest in the Executive’s general compliance with the law that
doomed the ESA’s citizen-suit provision.209 In short, outsourcing
the interpretation of the law to the public and to the judiciary
was the Article II infringement that Lujan prohibits.
But in recent years the Court’s standing decisions have
added a new and different dimension to the Article II violation,
and TransUnion supplies a stark example. When a
credit-reporting company defames you in violation of a statute,
concerns about the Take Care Clause are absent because the
Executive Branch isn’t a party to the litigation and its authority
to interpret the law isn’t implicated.210 And yet the Court held
206. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752, 761 (1984) (discussing Articles
II and III as the constitutional basis for the separation of powers explanation
of the standing doctrine).
207. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992).
208. Id.
209. See id. at 578 (“Nothing in this contradicts the principle that
‘[t]he . . . injury required by Art. III may exist solely by virtue of statutes
creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing.’” (quoting Warth
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975))).
210. See, e.g., Jackson Erpenbach, A Post-Spokeo Taxonomy of Intangible
Harms, 118 MICH. L. REV. 471, 505 (2019) (arguing that “consumer protection
cases do not raise concerns of asserting general grievances” because those
“suits are filed against private companies and allege conduct as to particular
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that “[p]rivate plaintiffs are not accountable to the people and
are not charged with pursuing the public interest in enforcing a
defendant’s general compliance with regulatory law,” and thus
resolving the case “would infringe on the Executive Branch’s
Article II authority.”211 While Lujan only prohibited
interference, TransUnion prohibits usurpation of the Executive
Branch’s enforcement authority.
This is an expansion of the prohibition, not just a change in
degree, because Congress cannot solve or avoid the problem by
adequately personalizing legal rights. The plaintiffs who lost in
TransUnion had a false OFAC designation placed on their
personal credit reports, and the FCRA conferred on them a
personal right to accurate information.212 In the move from
interference to usurpation, the Court’s objection shifted from
particularization to concreteness.213
Now consider Article III. Here too the Court’s justification
has shifted and expanded. Few would contest that a
congressional authorization for an advisory opinion violates
Article III’s requirement of a “judicial” “case” or “controversy.”214
While the reasoning of 1911’s Muskrat v. United States215 is
famously opaque, a plausible interpretation is that Congress’s
attempt to authorize a request for an advisory opinion was not
a “judicial” case within the meaning of Article III.216 In other

plaintiffs,” and “[t]he executive branch is neither conscripted into action nor
relieved of its Take Care Clause duties”).
211. TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2207 (2021); see also
Transcript of Oral Argument at 56–57, id. (No. 20-297) (suggesting, in a
question by Justice Kavanaugh, that the FCRA constitutes an impermissible
attempt by Congress to delegate law enforcement power to private attorneys
general).
212. See TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2213.
213. See, e.g., id. at 2212 (finding that the plaintiffs could not demonstrate
that there was a sufficient likelihood of imminent harm and therefore not a
serious risk of concrete harm).
214. See Sunstein, supra note 5, at 179 n.79 (“I do not contend that there
are no limits to Congress’ power to decide what is a ‘case’ or ‘controversy.’ In
all likelihood, for example, Congress is barred from overcoming the ban on
advisory opinions.”).
215. 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
216. See William Baude, Standing in the Shadow of Congress, 2016 SUP.
CT. REV. 197, 206–07, 207 nn.55, 59 (2016).
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words, Muskrat’s prohibition was also relatively modest: do not
authorize advisory opinions.217
Here too, particularization concerns underlie the
prohibition. While the statutes in Muskrat explicitly named the
parties authorized to sue, the legal right was again little more
than an undifferentiated public interest in the proper
interpretation of federal law.218 In recent years, however, the
Court’s interpretation of Article III’s case or controversy
requirement has dramatically expanded beyond Muskrat’s
modest prohibition. In both Spokeo and TransUnion, the Court’s
harping on “concreteness” is a departure from its concern about
particularization and injects a limitation on the character of the
legal rights that Congress can make privately enforceable.219
While Muskrat only prohibited advisory opinions, Spokeo and
TransUnion prohibit a vast array of injuries in law.220
With both Article II and Article III, the Court’s initial
concerns and justifications are legitimate. If a proper-party
requirement grounded in adverseness is at the heart of standing
doctrine, then there is something definitively non-judicial about
asking courts “to adjudicate only ‘[t]he public’s nonconcrete
interest in the proper administration of the laws.’”221 But in both
cases, the recent expansion of the prohibitions—and the
corresponding abandonment of particularization concerns—has
eroded their underlying rationales.
TransUnion assumes that the Executive Branch has a near
monopoly on the enforcement of federal law, but this assumption
217. See Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129–30 (1922) (citing Muskrat
and holding that an individual citizen does not have a right to institute a
judicial proceeding challenging the constitutionality of the proposed
Nineteenth Amendment when there was no individual harm alleged).
218. See Muskrat, 219 U.S. at 361 (“[T]here is neither more nor less in this
procedure than an attempt to provide for a judicial determination . . . of the
constitutional validity of an act of Congress.”).
219. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 334 (2016) (directing courts
to consider both the particularity and the concreteness of an alleged injury);
TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2204–07 (2021) (stating that
courts must consider concreteness even where Congress has created “a
statutory prohibition or obligation and a cause of action”).
220. See, e.g., TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2205 (“[U]nder Article III, an
injury in law is not an injury in fact.”).
221. Baude, supra note 216, at 226–27 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment)).
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has no grounding in history, text, or common sense: state
governments and private parties in both state and federal court
have long enforced federal law, so TransUnion’s prohibition on
usurpation is both novel and groundless.222 The net effect of
TransUnion is to funnel litigation that is congressionally
authorized but “insufficiently concrete” into state courts.223 The
logical next step is to prohibit the adjudication of federal law in
state courts—a breathtakingly ahistorical development.224
Similarly, the shifting interpretation of Article III—from
prohibiting advisory opinions to prohibiting injuries in law—is
startling and has wide-ranging implications. Justice Thomas’s
TransUnion dissent explains that “never before has this Court
declared that legislatures are constitutionally precluded from
creating legal rights enforceable in federal court if those rights
deviate too far from their common-law roots.”225 Following the
Court’s expansion of Article III’s prohibition, “courts alone have
the power to sift and weigh harms to decide whether they merit
the Federal Judiciary’s attention,” which “relieve[s] the
legislature of its power to create and define rights.”226
Others have noted the troubling implications of the Court’s
recent standing jurisprudence. D.C. Circuit Judge Judith W.
Rogers has explained, “Standing doctrine preserves the
separation of powers by limiting the circumstances in which a
private individual may invoke the judicial power to determine
the validity of executive or legislative action,” but
“[s]eparation-of-powers concerns are generally absent . . . when
a private party seeks to enforce only his personal rights against

222. See generally Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law,
86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698 (2011); Tommy Bennett, The Paradox of Exclusive
State-Court Jurisdiction over Federal Claims, 105 MINN. L. REV. 1211 (2021).
223. See TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2224 n.9 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
224. Cf. William A. Fletcher, The “Case or Controversy” Requirement in
State Court Adjudication of Federal Questions, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 263, 265
(1990) (arguing that state courts should adhere to the Article III case or
controversy requirement when adjudicating questions of federal law); Bennett,
supra note 222, at 1254 (“The first proposal in the scholarly literature is to
have state courts follow Article III standing doctrine, at least when
adjudicating federal claims.”).
225. TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2221 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
226. Id.
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another private party.”227 Discussing an Eighth Circuit opinion
cited with approval in TransUnion, William Baude noted that
the court has “cast doubt on whether Congress can expand
privacy rights beyond their common law scope at all. It is
unclear why, in this area, Congress should not be allowed to
protect interests beyond those protected by the common law, as
it has been allowed in other cases.”228 And Felix Wu has put a
finer point on it: “If government power against private parties is
limited by standing doctrine, then the doctrine may be serving
deregulatory goals, rather than the separation of
powers . . . . Whatever the merits of a deregulatory agenda, that
agenda should be established, if at all, through the political
process.”229
In sum, the Supreme Court has never offered a convincing
justification for employing standing doctrine to toss out suits
involving particularized injuries brought against private-sector
actors. Relying on an opaque and strained interpretation of
Articles II and III, the Court has adopted an approach that robs
duly elected legislators of their authority to fashion legal rights.
Instead of upsetting political consensus about injurious
practices, courts should embrace the products of the political
process.230
C.

Attempts at Solutions

Some jurists and scholars have attempted to bring order
and clarity to the courts’ standing jurisprudence. This section
considers four types of attempted solutions—risk and anxiety,
objective versus subjective privacy harms, public and private
rights, and deference to the legislature.
1. Risk and Anxiety
Two prominent privacy law scholars, Daniel J. Solove and
Danielle Keats Citron, responded to Clapper and Spokeo’s
227. Jeffries v. Volume Servs. Am., Inc., 928 F.3d 1059, 1070 (D.C. Cir.
2019) (Rogers, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (internal
quotation omitted).
228. Baude, supra note 216, at 223.
229. Wu, supra note 7, at 460.
230. See Ormerod, Privacy Injuries, supra note 22, at 41 (describing the
issues that arise from the Court’s approach in Spokeo).
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effects in lower-court data-breach cases by positing a two-forked
framework for analyzing informational injuries.231 They observe
that “[t]here has been no consistent or coherent judicial
approach to data-breach harms,” and that “[m]ore often than
not, a plaintiff’s increased risk of financial injury and anxiety is
deemed insufficient to warrant recognition of harm, even though
the law has evolved in other areas to redress such injures.”232
Solove and Citron survey how courts have recognized the
validity of risk and anxiety as legal injuries in other contexts,233
and they argue that courts should adopt a similar framework in
data-breach cases.234 With respect to risk, they argue that courts
“should determine whether a reasonable person would take
preventative measures and, if so, assess the harm based on the
reasonable cost of such measures.”235 As for anxiety, “[c]ourts
should employ an objective standard, assessing whether a
reasonable person would feel anxiety over any unmitigated risk
of future injury stemming from a data breach.”236
Solove and Citron’s approach illustrates that courts have a
tendency to treat privacy harms as exceptional—defying how
rules are applied elsewhere in the law.237 But their approach
can’t solve the two problems identified in Part II.B. First, their
adoption of an objective standard for both harms does hint at a
line-drawing principle, but courts’ recalcitrance in data-breach
cases suggests that the standard is of limited utility when
reasonable minds differ about the degree of risk created. Second,
at least in cases involving common-law claims of negligence,
Solove and Citron’s approach sidesteps the most potent
separation of powers objections. But in cases involving
statutorily-authorized suits against private-sector defendants,

231. Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory
of Data-Breach Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV. 737, 738–45 (2018).
232. Id. at 739.
233. Id. at 756–73.
234.
See id. at 774–77.
235. Id. at 774; see id. at 774–76 (describing the proposed framework to
evaluate risk).
236. Id. at 774; see id. at 776–77 (describing the proposed framework to
evaluate anxiety).
237. See id. at 773 (describing how both tort and contract cases “recognize
the intangible nature of data-breach harms”).
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they do not address the underlying structural concern with
courts substituting their judgment for the legislature.
Worse, TransUnion casts a pall on both sides of their
framework. On risk, the Court hints that risk of future injury
cannot supply a plaintiff with a concrete injury except when the
plaintiff seeks injunctive relief.238 Because few data-breach
victims seek injunctive relief, TransUnion’s discussion of risk
may imperil plaintiffs who seek damages arising from
not-yet-realized data-breach harms. On anxiety, the
TransUnion majority makes efforts to avoid condemning all
psychic injuries, but an unavoidable implication of the Court’s
dissemination holding is that courts will continue to treat
informational injuries as exceptional, given that the Court
repeatedly demanded proof about what absent class members
knew or thought.239
Finally, Solove and Citron’s approach—by its own
terms—applies only to data-breach cases.240 While the
framework could prove useful in that context, its scope is limited
to unauthorized information dissemination cases. Accordingly,
their approach leaves unaddressed the standing problems
created by other types of injurious uses of information. Risk of
and anxiety about identity fraud cannot help in cases that
involve, for example, facial recognition harms.
2.

Objective Versus Subjective Harms

Ryan Calo has argued that privacy harms can be classified
into two distinct categories—objective and subjective harms.241
The subjective category “is the perception of unwanted
observation,”
and
“describes
unwelcome
mental
states—anxiety, for instance, or embarrassment—that
accompany the belief that one is or will be watched or
monitored.”242 The objective category “is the unanticipated or

238. See supra notes 181–182 and accompanying text.
239. See TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2211 n.7 (2021).
240. See Solove & Citron, supra note 231, at 745 (focusing on data-breach
claims).
241. See M. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1131,
1133 (2011).
242. Id.
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coerced use of information concerning a person against that
person,” like selling personal information.243
While analytically helpful in taxonomizing distinct types of
privacy harms, Calo’s two categories are unavailing in the
context of Article III standing. Tasked with using Calo’s
categories, a court is likely to analyze objective harms under
Clapper’s future injury test and will likely regard subjective
harms—like Solove and Citron’s anxiety category—as
impossible to verify and therefore insufficiently concrete.244 And
here too, TransUnion calls into question the Article III
sufficiency of both sides of the equation.
3.

Public and Private Rights

Justice Thomas joined the majority’s opinion in Spokeo but
filed a separate opinion that lays out his theory of standing.245
Drawing on scholarship by Anne Woolhandler and Caleb Nelson
and by F. Andrew Hessick, Justice Thomas relies on a historical
distinction between “public rights” and “private rights” to
explain why the Ninth Circuit needed to reassess Robins’s
claims.246
Public rights are those “that involve duties owed to the
whole community, considered as a community, in its social
aggregate capacity.”247 Examples of public rights include “free
navigation of waterways, passage on public highways, and
general compliance with regulatory law.”248 Private rights, on
the other hand, belong “to individuals, considered as
individuals,”249 and they include “rights of personal security
243. Id.
244. Cf. Vance v. Vance, 408 A.2d 728, 733–34 (Md. 1979) (explaining that
recovery for emotional distress requires a “physical injury” and that this
requirement was “formulated with the overall purpose in mind of requiring
objective evidence to guard against feigned claims”).
245. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 343–49 (2016) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
246. See id. at 344 (citing Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 49, at 693);
id. at 347 (citing F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private
Rights, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 275, 317–21 (2008)).
247. Id. at 345 (internal quotation omitted) (quoting 4 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *5 (1769)).
248. Id. (citing Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 49, at 693).
249. Id. at 344 (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2).
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(including security of reputation), property rights, and contract
rights.”250
Justice Thomas explains that the concrete-injury
“requirement applies with special force when a plaintiff files suit
to require an executive agency to ‘follow the law.’”251 On the
other hand, “the concrete-harm requirement does not apply as
rigorously when a private plaintiff seeks to vindicate his own
private rights. Our contemporary decisions have not required a
plaintiff to assert an actual injury beyond the violation of his
personal legal rights.”252 In sum, “Congress cannot authorize
private plaintiffs to enforce public rights in their own names,
absent some showing that the plaintiff has suffered a concrete
harm particular to him,” but Congress can “create new private
rights and authorize private plaintiffs to sue based simply on
the violation of those private rights.”253
Justice Thomas nonetheless voted to vacate and remand in
Spokeo.254 While the FCRA “creates a series of regulatory
duties. . . . owe[d] to the public collectively”—like the
“requirement to post a toll-free telephone number on [Spokeo’s]
website”—there was “one claim in Robins’ complaint [that] rests
on a statutory provision that could arguably establish a private
cause of action to vindicate the violation of a privately held
right”: the requirement that Spokeo “follow reasonable
procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the
information concerning the individual about whom the report
relates.”255 “If Congress has created a private duty owed
personally to Robins to protect his information,” Justice Thomas
concluded, “then the violation of the legal duty suffices for
Article III injury in fact.”256
Justice Thomas has illustrated his framework three times
after Spokeo. First, in a case involving allegations that Google
disclosed the contents of search queries in violation of the Stored
250. Id. (internal quotation omitted) (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *1; Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 49, at 693).
251. Id. at 346.
252. Id. at 347 (citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978)).
253. Id. at 348.
254. See id.
255. Id. at 348–49 (internal quotation marks omitted) (second brackets in
original) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b)).
256. Id. at 1553 (emphasis omitted).
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Communications Act,257 Justice Thomas explained that the
statute “creates a private right” because it “prohibits certain
electronic service providers from knowingly divulging the
contents of a communication sent by a user . . . of the service.”258
This “established standing” because the plaintiffs “alleg[ed] the
violation of private duties owed personally to them as
individuals.”259
Second, in Thole v. United States Bank260—a case involving
allegations that a bank violated fiduciary duties under the
Employment
Retirement
Income
Security
Act
261
(ERISA) —Justice Thomas explained that the statute did not
create any private rights that belonged to the participants in a
defined-benefit plan: “[N]one of the rights identified by
petitioners belong to them. The fiduciary duties created by
ERISA are owed to the plan, not petitioners.”262 Specifically, as
“participants in a defined benefit plan, petitioners ha[d] no legal
or equitable ownership interest in the plan assets,” and there
had “been no assignment of the plan’s rights by ERISA or any
contract.”263
Third, Justice Thomas authored the principal dissent in
TransUnion, and his opinion answers several important
questions about his interpretation of the public/private rights
framework. On the narrow question about the FCRA left
unresolved in Spokeo, Justice Thomas concluded that the
statute creates several private rights.264 With regard to
inaccurate disseminations, the FCRA “creates a duty: to use
reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy.
And that duty is particularized to an individual: the subject of

257. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712.
258. Frank v. Gaos, 139 S. Ct. 1041, 1047 (2019) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(internal quotation omitted) (quoting 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510(13), 2702(a)(1)–(2),
(b)).
259. Id. (internal quotation omitted) (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578
U.S. 330, 349 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring)).
260. 140 S. Ct. 1615 (2020).
261. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974).
262. Thole, 140 S. Ct. at 1623 (Thomas, J., concurring).
263. Id.
264. See TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2218 (2021)
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
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the report.”265 The same was true, he says, about the
information access rights.266
But the opinion also resolves a broader question. Spokeo
produced uncertainty about how restrictive or permissive
Justice Thomas’s framework would prove.267 William Baude
argued that a restrictive answer would wed Congress’s
authority to only four specific forms (property, contract, tort,
privilege);268 a more permissive answer seems to jettison the
concreteness inquiry entirely, requiring only that a private right
be “adequately personalized—owed to a specific person or group
of persons rather than to the public at large.”269 Justice
Thomas’s TransUnion opinion endorses the permissive version:
he critiques the majority’s decision as mandating that, “[n]o
matter if the right is personal or if the legislature deems the
right worthy of legal protection, legislatures are constitutionally
unable to offer the protection of the federal courts for anything
other than money, bodily integrity, and anything else that this
Court thinks looks close enough to rights existing at common
law.”270 While Justice Thomas’s Spokeo opinion laid the
foundation for a more aggressive role for the judiciary,271 his
TransUnion opinion criticizes the majority’s disrespect for the
democratic process.272
Justice Thomas’s framework—particularly as refined in his
TransUnion dissentis responsive to both of the problems
265. Id.
266. See id. (discussing 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a), (c)(2)).
267. See Baude, supra note 216, at 230.
268. See id. at 231 (discussing Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118
(1939)); see also Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 137–38 (1939)
(suggesting that a private legal right must be “a legal right,—one of property,
one arising out of contract, one protected against tortious invasion, or one
founded on a statute which confers a privilege”).
269. Baude, supra note 216, at 231.
270. TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2221 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
271. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 347 (2016) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (“[B]y limiting Congress’ ability to delegate law enforcement
authority to private plaintiffs and the courts, standing doctrine preserves
executive discretion.”).
272. See TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2221 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(“According to the majority, courts alone have the power to sift and weigh
harms to decide whether they merit the Federal Judiciary’s attention. In the
name of protecting the separation of powers, this Court has relieved the
legislature of its power to create and define rights.” (citation omitted)).
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identified in Part II.B. As to the line-drawing problem, Justice
Thomas obviates distinctions between sufficiently and
insufficiently concrete injuries.273 And Justice Thomas’s
vociferous criticism of the TransUnion majority is rooted in
concerns about usurping legislatures’ authority to shape and
create new legal rights.274
There are, nonetheless, two shortcomings with Justice
Thomas’s framework. The first is the most obvious: a majority
of the Court has now rejected the permissive version of the
public/private rights framework. Given that Justice Gorsuch
joined Justice Thomas’s opinion in Thole, Justice Gorsuch may
be receptive to the more restrictive version of the public/private
rights approach.275 But as the framework becomes increasingly
restrictive—and as it thereby limits Congress’s discretion to
create and shape new legal rights—the framework’s
responsiveness to the line-drawing and counter-majoritarian
problems wanes.
Second, it’s not clear what difference—if any—there is
between a private right and a particularized right. TransUnion
suggests there is no difference—that Congress’s adequate
personalization of a legal right makes the right a private one.276
But Thole suggests that there is some daylight between private
rights and particularized rights.277 ERISA authorizes
participants in defined-benefit plans to sue for violations of the
273. See Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 346–47 (Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing
concreteness in relation to public and private rights); TransUnion, 141 S. Ct.
at 2219 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
Rejecting this history, the majority holds that the mere violation of
a personal legal right is not—and never can be—an injury sufficient
to establish standing. What matters for the Court is only that the
“injury in fact be ‘concrete.”‘ “No concrete harm, no standing.” That
may be a pithy catchphrase, but it is worth pausing to ask why
“concrete” injury in fact should be the sole inquiry. (citations
omitted)
274. See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
275. See Thole v. U.S. Bank N. Am., 140 S. Ct. 1615, 1622–23 (2020)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (joined by Gorsuch, J.).
276. See TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2220 (2021)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“A statute that creates a private right and a cause of
action, however, does gives plaintiffs an adequate interest in vindicating their
private rights in federal court.”).
277. See Thole, 140 S. Ct. at 1623 (indicating that even though a private
cause of action is allowed, it is not available in the particular case).
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statute, which therefore differentiates between those authorized
to sue (participants, among others) and the public at large.278
In other words, Justice Thomas’s implementation of the
public/private rights framework can produce arbitrary
outcomes—sometimes respecting the democratic process and
sometimes not. Recall that the advisory opinions ban is only
implicated when plaintiffs have an undifferentiated interest in
regulatory compliance.279 Does anyone really think that ERISA
authorizes advisory opinions but that the FCRA doesn’t? By
differentiating between the public and plan participants,
Congress adequately particularized the ERISA rights.280
Empowering plan participants to hold self-dealing trustees
liable doesn’t constrain the Executive or call for an advisory
opinion, so it’s difficult to reconcile Justice Thomas’s
TransUnion opinion with his approach in Thole.
4.

Deference to the Legislature

Several commentators have sought to address problems
with the Court’s standing jurisprudence by emphasizing the
importance of deferring to the legislature’s choice to make a
right privately enforceable.
Cass Sunstein, for example, has argued that strict limits on
Congress’s standing authority are akin to substantive due
process: both “use[] highly contestable ideas about political
theory to invalidate congressional enactments, even though the
relevant constitutional text and history do not call for
invalidation at all.”281 Relatedly, William Baude has advanced a
“more nuanced and sympathetic” version of the analogy.282 Both
substantive due process and limits on Congress’s standing
authority begin with uncontroversial propositions but can
quickly end up in deeply contested waters. It “might have been
satisfying to conclude that standing limitations do not apply to
278. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (permitting plan participants, beneficiaries,
and others specifically defined to bring a civil action against those violating
the statute).
279. See supra notes 214–219 and accompanying text.
280. See Thole, 140 S. Ct. at 1625–26 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(discussing how plan beneficiaries have a private interest in the plan’s
financial integrity).
281. Sunstein, supra note 5, at 167.
282. Baude, supra note 216, at 224.
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the legislature at all—but that would suggest that Congress
could even go so far as to authorize federal courts to issue
advisory opinions, whose illegality is supposedly one of the
paradigm rules of Article III.”283 But procedural legal rights,
Baude says, raise similar problems as advisory opinions—“the
possibility of courts being asked to adjudicate only the public’s
nonconcrete interest in the proper administration of the
laws.”284 In sum, “once courts have started invalidating such
statutory rights, it is easy to see how they might keep going.”285
In past work, I have argued that informational injuries
deserve particular deference.286 To prevent Spokeo and its
progeny from gutting privacy law, I have argued that the federal
courts “should give binding deference to Congress’s decision to
make an injury privately enforceable when three conditions are
met: when the plaintiff alleges an informational injury; when
the defendant is a private-sector actor; and when Congress has
effectively personalized the injury and the plaintiff is among the
injured.”287 The first condition recognizes the inherent
difficulties in assessing the “concreteness” of an informational
injury, while the second and third conditions rebut separation
of powers objections by constraining deference to private-sector
defendants and by using particularization to avoid concerns
about advisory opinions.288
While deference to the legislature blunts the problems
outlined in Part II.B, these approaches have their own issues.
Approaches that emphasize deference address both the
line-drawing and separation of powers problems by removing
line-drawing authority from the courts altogether, instead
empowering the legislature. But as Baude highlights, it’s not
true that the courts have no role in statutory standing
cases—the “rule that all federal legal rights can be vindicated in
federal court has been replaced with a judicial limitation on
which legal rights are sufficiently real to be judicially
283. Id. at 226.
284. Id. at 227 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted) (quoting
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment)).
285. Id.
286. See generally Ormerod, Privacy Injuries, supra note 22.
287. Id. at 137–38.
288. See id. at 149–64.
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enforced.”289 So allowing any role for the courts introduces the
same line-drawing problem that we’re seeking to solve.
In any event, the Supreme Court has evinced no interest in
deferring questions of standing to the legislature, and there’s no
reason to believe TransUnion will be the last word on the
matter.
***
This Part diagnosed two significant problems with the
Supreme Court’s recent Article III standing jurisprudence and
illustrated the shortcomings with proposed solutions to these
and related problems. The next Part begins laying the
groundwork for a new solution.
III. PRIVACY AS CONTEXTUAL INTEGRITY
Perhaps the simplest approach to privacy is the secrecy
paradigm: only that which is secret may be considered private.
But decades of scholarship have revealed the incoherency and
inadequacy of privacy-as-secrecy.290 Among the most convincing
and influential responses to binary privacy is Helen
Nissenbaum’s contextual integrity framework—the simple but
profound observation that “a right to privacy is neither a right
to secrecy nor a right to control but a right to appropriate flow
of personal information.”291
This Part first describes Nissenbaum’s contextual integrity
framework and then highlights its limits. Doing so supplies the
tools for forging a legal framework in Part IV that solves the
current problems with the Court’s informational-injury
standing cases.
A. A Contextual Integrity Primer
Nissenbaum’s seminal work on contextual integrity begins
with dual observations—that information technology holds
immense power over us and that prevailing approaches to
289. Baude, supra note 216, at 227.
290. See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 23 (2008) (“The
privacy-as-secrecy conception fails to recognize that individuals want to keep
things Private from some people but not others.”); ARI EZRA WALDMAN, PRIVACY
AS TRUST: INFORMATION PRIVACY FOR AN INFORMATION AGE 22–24 (2018)
(identifying three fundamental problems with the secrecy paradigm).
291. NISSENBAUM, supra note 29, at 127.
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privacy provide unsatisfactory answers to these threats.292 Most
prominently, Nissenbaum argues against several different
conceptions of a public/private dichotomy: “Approaches to
privacy that restrict its sphere of legitimacy to the
private . . . are founded on a set of assumptions about the
relationship between privacy and the public/private dichotomy
that ultimately are incoherent.”293 There are, she says, “no
actors, no spheres, no information that can be assigned
unconditionally to the domain of the public, free of all and any
constraints imposed by rights of privacy; none are ‘up for
grabs.’”294
Nissenbaum’s solution begins with the insight that “[w]hat
people care most about is not simply restricting the flow of
information but ensuring that it flows appropriately.”295 The
framework of contextual integrity “makes rigorous the notion of
appropriateness” by looking to context-relative informational
norms.296 “When these norms are contravened,” she explains,
“we experience this as a violation of privacy.”297 In short,
contextual integrity “is defined in terms of informational norms:
it is preserved when informational norms are respected and
violated when informational norms are breached.”298
Contextual integrity has a descriptive component and a
normative component. The descriptive component is a heuristic
that speaks to whether a given informational practice violates
privacy.
Nissenbaum
explains
that
context-relative
informational norms have four key parameters: contexts, actors,
attributes, and transmission protocols.299 Together, these
parameters “prescribe, for a given context, the type of
information, the parties who are the subjects of the information
as well as those who are sending and receiving it, and the
principles under which this information is transmitted.”300

292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

See id. at 19–64, 65–126.
Id. at 125–26.
Id. at 126.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 127.
Id.
Id. at 140.
Id.
Id. at 141.
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Contexts: Nissenbaum defines contexts as “structured
social settings characterized by canonical activities, roles,
relationships, power structures, norms (or rules), and internal
values (goals, ends, purposes).”301 Throughout, she references
several straightforward examples of contexts, including “a grade
school in an educational context; a hospital in a healthcare
context; [and] a department store in a commercial
marketplace.”302 Other examples raise harder definitional
questions.303
Actors: There are three relevant types of actors: senders of
information, recipients of information, and information
subjects.304
Attributes: Attributes ask about the type of information
being transmitted.305 “In a healthcare context . . . strictures on
information flow vary according to roles and . . . type of
information . . . whether it be patients’ medical conditions, their
attire, their addresses and phone number, the name and code
number of their health insurance carrier, or the balance on their
accounts.”306
Transmission
Protocols: A
transmission
protocol,
Nissenbaum explains, “is a constraint on the flow . . . of
information from party to party in a context.”307 Examples of
transmission protocols include: confidentiality, which prohibits
an information recipient from sharing the information with
others; reciprocity, which requires bidirectional information
flows; dessert, which provides than an actor deserves to receive
information; and compulsion, which provides that one party is
compelled or mandated to reveal information to another.308
With these four parameters of norms in hand, Nissenbaum
explains how to employ them to identify privacy violations: first,
establish the prevailing context; second, identify key actors;
third, ascertain what attributes are affected; and fourth,
301. Id. at 132.
302. Id. at 149.
303. See, e.g., id. (“Should one tell one’s friend her spouse is having an
affair? . . . Should a hospital share injury records with police officers?”).
304. Id. at 141–43.
305. Id. at 143.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 145.
308. Id.
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establish changes in transmission principles.309 “If the new
practice generates changes in actors, attributes, or transmission
principles, the practice is flagged as violating entrenched
informational norms and constitutes a prima facie violation of
contextual integrity.”310
Nissenbaum’s framework also has a normative dimension.
She explains that, aside from describing and predicting
reactions, contextual integrity can serve as a prescriptive
guide—telling us which novel informational practices should be
regarded as acceptable.311 The normative component compares
“entrenched
normative
practices
against
novel
alternatives . . . on the basis of how effective each is in
supporting, achieving, or promoting relevant contextual
values.”312
In other words, we ask about why information is flowing in
a certain way and evaluate whether changes to that flow are in
furtherance of the purposes and values of the relevant context.
For example, consider a company’s desire to access its
employees’ medical records.313 Nissenbaum explains, “even if a
general cost-benefit analysis or a comparison and trade-off of
interests indicates in favor of employers, the analysis via
contextual integrity would most likely prohibit release of
medical information to employers under the assumption that
benefits accrued by employers are irrelevant to the attainment
of healthcare goals.”314 In contrast, imagine a person’s desire to
access the medical records of a romantic partner.315 “In the case
of lovers, however, what is known of sexually transmitted
diseases suggests there might be conditions under which sexual
partners may have a right to limited access to each other’s
medical records even without permission from the subject,”
because doing so furthers the purposes, goals, and values of the
healthcare context.316

309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.

Id. at 149–50.
Id. at 150.
Id.
Id. at 166.
See id. at 172 (outlining this hypothetical situation).
Id.
See id. (setting up this scenario).
Id.
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In sum, Nissenbaum explains, the right to privacy is “a
right to live in a world in which our expectations about the flow
of personal information are, for the most part, met,” and her
contextual integrity framework both describes and prescribes
appropriate informational flows “through the harmonious
balance of social rules, or norms, with both local and general
values, ends, and purposes.”317
B. Contextual Integrity’s Limits and Shortcomings
Nissenbaum’s contextual integrity framework is a powerful
tool for capturing the key insight that privacy is context specific.
But the framework is not without inherent limits and
shortcomings—particularly when employed as a legal standard.
Most significantly, Nissenbaum’s framework is philosophical
and moral in nature, not legal. Attempting to fashion
Nissenbaum’s philosophical and moral framework into a legal
test is difficult.
Other scholars have noted this difficulty. For example,
Dennis Hirsch has evaluated the utility of contextual integrity
while addressing harms from predictive analytics.318 Hirsch first
explains contextual integrity’s descriptive force regarding
predictive analytics.319 But the normative component is
necessary, Hirsch says, because norms and technology
change.320 In other words, contextual integrity “must identify a
way to distinguish norm-breaking data practices that are
legitimate and acceptable[] from those that are not.”321 “Data
317. Id. at 231.
318. See Dennis D. Hirsch, From Individual Control to Social Protection:
New Paradigms for Privacy Law in the Age of Predictive Analytics, 79 MD. L.
REV. 439, 468–71 (2020) (noting that Nissenbaum and other scholars leaned
on contextual integrity because “notice, consent, and the other elements of the
control paradigm do not protect people sufficiently from the harms of
predictive analytics”). Hirsch defines predictive analytics as “a technological
process that analyzes surface data in order to infer and act on the latent
information that lies beneath the surface.” Id. at 441–42.
319. See id. at 469 (“Business use of predictive analytics that accords
with . . . context-specific norms is presumptively appropriate; that which does
not . . . is presumptively inappropriate.”).
320. Id.
321. Id. (citing Helen Nissenbaum & Solon Barocas, Big Data’s End Run
Around Anonymity and Consent, in PRIVACY, BIG DATA, AND THE PUBLIC GOOD
44, 47 (Julia Lane et al. eds., 2014)).
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practices that transgress informational norms are permissible
where they are ‘more effective in promoting interests, general
moral and political values, and context-specific ends, purposes,
and values’ such as ‘fairness, justice, freedom, autonomy, [and]
welfare’ . . . than those practices that comply with existing
informational norms.”322
Hirsch takes issue with the normative component of the
analysis: A test that relies on evaluating values like fairness,
justice, freedom, autonomy, and so forth “is so vague as to be
almost
unworkable.
Which . . . values
is
one
to
consider? . . . And who is to say that Nissenbaum and [her
coauthor Solon] Barocas have even arrived at the right list?”323
Further, Hirsch argues, there is an additional layer of difficulty
in ascertaining “whether the data practice in question would
further these values better than alternative practices that are
consistent with existing informational norms.”324
In a related vein, Nissenbaum’s framework—by its own
terms—is directed toward a specific type of problem: evaluating
how technological change and novel information flows violate
entrenched norms.325 Employing it as a legal test applies the
framework to different ends—evaluating, instead, whether a
defendant’s informational practices have injured the plaintiff.
A second and related limit to contextual integrity—at least
when employed as a legal test—is its indeterminacy. The
framework has a tendency toward complexity, requiring the
identification of five distinct criteria (context, actors, attributes,
transmission protocols, and purpose) before a decisionmaker
can evaluate whether a norm has been and should be
transgressed.326 And even then, the framework only sometimes
provides definite answers.327
322. Id. (quoting Helen Nissenbaum & Solon Barocas, Big Data’s End Run
Around Anonymity and Consent, in PRIVACY, BIG DATA, AND THE PUBLIC GOOD
44, 48 (Julia Lane et al. eds., 2014)).
323. Id. at 470.
324. Id. at 471.
325. See NISSENBAUM, supra note 29, at 21 (laying the background of
technological changes and the corresponding impact on “human social
activities” before applying the proposed contextual integrity framework).
326. See, e.g., id. at 140–47 (detailing each individual criterion at the
beginning of the discussion of the contextual integrity framework).
327. The examples related to accessing medical records, supra notes
313– 316, provide an apt illustration of indeterminacy. “[E]ven if a general
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As a philosophical tool, this indeterminacy may not be a
problem, but judges, legislatures, and litigants crave rules with
clearly right and clearly wrong answers.328 If contextual
integrity has value as a legal test, it must provide clear and
straightforward answers to legal questions.
A final pair of shortcomings are related to contextual
integrity’s explicit reliance on past practice. As Nissenbaum
puts it, the descriptive component of contextual integrity “is
inherently conservative, flagging as problematic any departure
from entrenched practice.”329 To be sure, the framework’s
normative dimension is intended to combat the descriptive
component’s inherent conservativeness.330 By marrying
contextual integrity’s descriptive and normative components,
“there is a presumption in favor of entrenched rules rather than
strict adherence to the letter that can be overridden if new
practices are demonstrably more effective at achieving
contextual values, ends, and purposes.”331
But as a legal test, the backward-looking nature of
contextual integrity raises a problem familiar to privacy law
scholars—endogeneity.332 After all, entrenched informational
norms are at least partly dictated by existing legal rules about

cost-benefit analysis or a comparison and trade-off of interests indicates in
favor of employers, the analysis via contextual integrity would most likely
prohibit release of medical information to employers.” NISSENBAUM, supra note
29, at 172 (emphasis added). “In the case of lovers, however, what is known of
sexually transmitted diseases suggests there might be conditions under which
sexual partners may have a right to limited access.” Id. (emphasis added).
328. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Judges as Moral Reasoners, 7 INT’L J.
CONST. L. 2, 13 (2009) (inferring that bright-line rules are easiest to apply, but
not without their own challenges: “even when they are finding and applying
clear law—clear statutes, the clear provisions of a constitution, or clear
precedents obviously on point—judges are not machines”).
329. NISSENBAUM, supra note 29, at 161.
330. See id. (noting that contextual integrity is a “normative approach to
privacy,” and with that is “a keener measure of morally relevant change than
other predominant approaches”).
331. Id. at 179.
332. See, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman et al., The Endogeneity of Legal
Regulation: Grievance Procedures as Rational Myth, 105 AM. J. SOCIO. 406, 407
(1999) (explaining that endogeneity occurs in the legal setting because “the
content and meaning of law is determined within the social field that it is
designed to regulate”).
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permissible and impermissible information flows.333 So
contextual integrity as a legal rule simultaneously looks to past
practice to define what is acceptable and itself defines what is
acceptable.
The endogeneity of privacy expectations sometimes arises
with the reasonable expectation of privacy test from Katz v.
United States.334 If people reasonably expect that the
government will not eavesdrop on their phone conversations,
from where does that expectation originate? Surely not on past
practice since most wiretaps did not violate the Fourth
Amendment before Katz.335
In some Fourth Amendment cases, the Court ignores
expectations or insists they’re irrelevant, but other cases turn
on the Court’s sense of popular expectations about privacy.336
The net result is circularity: “[R]easonable people should expect
the privacy rights granted to them by the courts. So expectations
define the scope of the legal protection, but the legal protections
themselves should define the expectations.”337 In short,
“individual ‘expectations of privacy’ . . . are not . . . exogenous
variables; rather, they are significantly shaped by the law
itself.”338

333. See supra notes 309–310 and accompanying text (providing the
example of how entrenched informational norms interact with privacy
violations).
334. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
335. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (“The
reasonable view is that one who installs in his house a telephone instrument
with connecting wires intends to project his voice to those quite outside, and
that the wires beyond his house, and messages while passing over them, are
not within the protection of the Fourth Amendment.”).
336. See Matthew B. Kugler & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Myth of Fourth
Amendment Circularity, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1747, 1756 nn.27–28 (2017)
[hereinafter Kugler & Strahilevitz, The Myth] (detailing Supreme Court
decisions that use “employees’ expectations . . . to determine the scope of the
Fourth Amendment,” in contrast with other decisions that “treat popular
expectations as irrelevant”).
337. Id. at 1750; see also infra Part V.B. But cf. Kugler & Strahilevitz, The
Myth, supra note 336, at 1176–94 (using empirical evidence to argue that
circularity is a myth).
338. Perry Dane, A Tale of Two Clauses: Search and Seizure,
Establishment of Religion, and Constitutional Reason, 26 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 939, 961 (2018).
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Similarly, if informational norms are shaped by what courts
and legislatures define as acceptable and unacceptable, over
time contextual integrity becomes self-referential, and the
primary justification for an informational practice is that it has
been deemed acceptable in the past.
***
With this understanding of contextual integrity in hand,
the next Part proposes a legal framework for assessing whether
a plaintiff alleging an informational injury has suffered a
concrete and particularized Article III injury in fact.
IV. CONTEXTUAL INTEGRITY AS A LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR
ARTICLE III INJURIES
Contextual integrity’s insight that privacy is context
specific and governed by context-relative informational norms
supplies a foundation for assessing whether a plaintiff alleging
an informational injury has suffered an injury in fact. This Part
builds on that foundation by fashioning a legal framework for
Article III standing based on contextual integrity and by
illustrating how to use it.
A.

Constructing the Legal Framework

The central contribution of this framework is that the
breach of an informational norm supplies the plaintiff with a
concrete injury in fact. When a statute protects a norm and the
defendant contravenes the statute and the norm, the plaintiff
has a concrete injury. When, instead, a statute authorizes a suit
for an informational practice, but the defendant has not
contravened an informational norm, the plaintiff lacks a
concrete injury in fact.
The legal framework for assessing which informational
injuries create a concrete injury in fact therefore has two steps.
First, the reviewing court should identify the defendant’s acts or
practices that the plaintiff is contesting and determine which of
the four informational injuries the plaintiff is alleging. Second,
the reviewing court should identify whether the contested acts
or practices contravene an entrenched informational norm. If so,
then the defendant’s breach of both the statute and the norm
supplies the plaintiff with a concrete injury in fact. If the
defendant has only violated the statute—but there has been no
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breach of an entrenched informational norm—then the plaintiff
must provide some additional basis for invoking the jurisdiction
of the federal courts.
1.

Identify the Injury

The first step of the analysis requires the reviewing court
to assess the statutory provision on which the plaintiff’s cause
of action relies. As detailed in Part I.B, there are four types of
informational injuries—collecting, using, disseminating, and
withholding. The court’s task is to evaluate the allegations in
the plaintiff’s complaint and determine which one or more
injuries are alleged. This analysis should proceed on an
allegation-by-allegation basis, isolating each of the plaintiff’s
theories of injury and each of the defendant’s acts or practices
the plaintiff contests. Perhaps the plaintiff avers that the
defendant collected information in violation of the statute and
then proceeded to disseminate the information to third parties
also in violation of the statute.339 The court should assess the
collection injury and the dissemination injury separately.
Information collection and dissemination injuries present
the most straightforward cases. Information use cases may be
more complex because of the myriad injurious ways to use
information.340 Consider, for example, a case involving claims
that a social networking company illegally created a facial
recognition scan and then used the scan to help tailor
advertising. Such a case has two different information use
harms: using photos to create the prohibited facial recognition
scan is one information use injury and using the scan to tailor
and serve advertising is a second information use injury.
Information withholding cases may seem peculiar but
should be easy to identify because of their specific set of
facts—has information been withheld from a plaintiff that is
legally entitled to it? If so, it’s safe to assume that the allegation
is information withholding.

339. See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 519 (2001); see also supra
notes 8088, 98101 and accompanying text.
340. See supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text.
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2.

Identify the Norm

The second step of the analysis requires the reviewing court
to identify which informational norms, if any, the defendant has
breached. For each statutory violation that also violates a norm,
the plaintiff has a concrete injury in fact. But for each statutory
violation that does not violate an entrenched informational
norm, the plaintiff must allege more to satisfy the strictures of
Article III.
Evaluating the relationship between a statute and an
informational norm will often prove helpful. Sometimes a
legislature enacts a law that codifies a preexisting informational
norm. For example, when Congress first enacted the Wiretap
Act in 1968, it codified a preexisting norm against the collection
and dissemination of phone conversations.341 Sometimes a
legislature enacts a law that—over time—helps establish a new
informational norm. For example, when Congress enacted the
Stored Communications Act (and amended the Wiretap Act) in
1986, it helped establish a new informational norm against the
collection and dissemination of email content.342
In both norm-codification and norm-establishment cases,
the fact that a plaintiff alleges a violation of both a statute and
a norm is a sufficient basis for invoking the jurisdiction of the
federal courts. Only in situations where a statute does not
protect an informational norm will a plaintiff need something
more. Take the Spokeo majority’s discussion of disseminating an
incorrect zip code in violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act.343
Congress helped establish many new informational norms when
it enacted the FCRA in 1970, but few people would regard the
dissemination of an incorrect zip code as breaching an
entrenched informational norm.344 Hence, the plaintiff in the
incorrect-zip-code case will need to show something other than
the statutory violation to satisfy Article III—perhaps
disseminating an incorrect zip code had some other downstream
341. For a more thorough discussion of the Wiretap Act, see infra Part
IV.B.1.
342. For a more thorough discussion of the Stored Communications Act,
see infra Part IV.B.1.
343. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 342 (2016).
344. For a more thorough discussion of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, see
infra Part IV.B.2.

MAKING PRIVACY INJURIES CONCRETE

157

effects, like increasing the plaintiff’s borrowing costs or
excluding the plaintiff from prospective employment.345 The
framework thus offers a sufficient basis for demonstrating an
injury in fact, but it doesn’t operate to the exclusion of other
grounds for satisfying Article III.
Identifying entrenched informational norms won’t always
be easy. In close or convoluted cases, courts should analyze the
parameters from Nissenbaum’s descriptive component:
identifying the context, actors, information type, and
expectations should clarify the existence or absence of an
informational norm.
B.

Using the Framework

With a description of the legal framework in hand, this
section now illustrates how to use the framework. The
authorities covered in this section include privacy laws large
and small—spanning federal and state, privately and publicly
enforceable, settled and proposed.
1.

Authorities that Always or Usually Create an Injury in
Fact

This section reviews a host of legal authorities that always
or almost always protect entrenched information norms. As a
result, plaintiffs that allege violations of these statutes should
usually have a concrete injury in fact.
The Wiretap Act (WTA) is an apt example of a statutory
prohibition on collecting and disseminating information that
protects entrenched informational norms.346 Violations of the
WTA’s prohibition are thus per se concrete Article III injuries in
fact.
The WTA punishes any person who intentionally intercepts
or intentionally discloses any wire, oral, or electronic
communication.347 Congress first enacted this prohibition in

345. See infra note 400 and accompanying text.
346. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (banning the interception or use of certain
“wire, oral, or electronic communication”).
347. Id.
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1968,348 shortly after and in response to the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Berger v. New York349 and Katz v. United States.350
Before Katz, the Supreme Court had held in 1928’s
Olmstead v. United States351 that intercepting a suspect’s
telephone conversations to obtain evidence of a crime didn’t
trigger the Fourth Amendment absent a physical intrusion on
the suspect’s constitutionally protected property.352 The Court
nonetheless “implied that Congress could enact legislation to
protect the secrecy of telephone messages by making them
inadmissible in federal criminal trials.”353 The Olmstead
decision “was greeted with little charity,” and “[t]he widely felt
adverse reaction may have been responsible in part for the
passage of the Federal Communications Act354 some seven years
later.”355 Section 605 of that law “prohibited the interception and
divulgence in federal trials of evidence obtained through
wiretapping,” and after its enactment “cases involving the use
of wiretapping, whether by federal or state officials, were
disposed of under this section.”356 In a series of decisions
interpreting section 605, “the Court in effect poured the Fourth
Amendment into the Federal Communications Act.”357 A
commentator in 1965 explained that “although the Court was
chary of broadly defining the fourth amendment to restrict
eavesdropping, it was equally reluctant to allow unrestricted
348. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No.
90-351, 82 Stat. 197, 213 (1968).
349. 388 U.S. 41, 63 (1967).
350. See Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197, 21112 (discussing the need for
the prohibition).
351. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
352. See id. at 464 (contrasting the interception of a telephone
conversation with a sealed letter in the mail, the latter of which would be
protected from “unlawful rifling by a government agent”).
353. Mary E. Bisantz, Electronic Eavesdropping Under the Fourth
Amendment—After Berger and Katz, 17 BUFF. L. REV. 455, 457 (1968).
354. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934)
(codified as amended 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–646).
355. Minn. L. Rev. Ed. Bd., Eavesdropping and the Constitution: A
Reappraisal of the Fourth Amendment Framework, 50 MINN. L. REV. 378, 388
(1965).
356. Bisantz, supra note 353, at 458.
357. Minn. L. Rev. Ed. Bd., supra note 355, at 388 (quoting Alan F. Westin,
The Wire-Tapping Problem: An Analysis and a Legislative Proposal, 52 COLUM.
L. REV. 165, 177 (1952) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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eavesdropping outside the boundaries of fourth amendment
protection.”358
State tort law evolved concurrently to recognize a civil cause
of action against wiretapping.359 Taken together, there can be
little dispute that—by the time the Court reversed Olmstead in
1967360—there was a widespread informational norm against
intercepting phone conversations. When Congress enacted the
WTA in 1968, it therefore codified that norm. As a result, when
a plaintiff alleges a violation of the WTA, the plaintiff will
typically have a concrete injury.
The Stored Communications Act (SCA) prohibits
“obtain[ing] . . . a wire or electronic communication” without
authorization.361 This prohibition “has been interpreted over the
years to cover the content of emails, private Facebook messages,
[and] YouTube videos,” among other types of information.362
Congress enacted the SCA in 1986—“at the infancy of the
Internet”—in an attempt to extend the WTA’s protections to
new digital forms of communication.363
As noted, the WTA lagged far behind the public’s
widespread use of the telephoneand consequently, far behind
the public’s conception of telephonic privacy. Like the WTA, the
SCA protects an entrenched informational norm against
intercepting and disclosing communicative content, and
therefore violations of the SCA constitute concrete injuries.
Courts that have considered whether interceptions that
violate the SCA create concrete injuries have agreed that they
do. The Ninth Circuit recently explained that Facebook’s
interception of the content of user communications violated the
amended WTA and the SCA, and held that the statutes “codify
a context-specific extension of the substantive right to

358. Id. at 388–89.
359. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 390 (1960)
(noting the law’s evolution beyond protection of physical intrusions) (citing
Rhodes v. Graham, 37 S.W.2d 46 (Ky. 1931)).
360. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (partially
overruling Olmstead).
361. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a).
362. RICHARD M. THOMPSON II & JARED P. COLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV.,
R44036, STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT: REFORM OF THE ELECTRONIC
COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT (ECPA) i (2015), perma.cc/6PKX-XW3X (PDF).
363. Id. at i, 1–2.
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privacy.”364 A month later, the Ninth Circuit recognized that
Facebook’s practice of tracking users’ online browsing habits in
violation of the WTA and the SCA were concrete injuries, again
noting that “these statutory provisions codify a substantive
right to privacy, the violation of which gives rise to a concrete
injury sufficient to confer standing.”365 The panels relied on
Spokeo’s flimsy and malleable distinction between substance
and procedure,366 but contextual integrity shows us that the
conclusion is correct—not because the statutes use or avoid
specifics words, but instead because violations of these laws
contravene entrenched informational norms about the
confidentiality of communicative content.
The Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) is an
example of an information use injury that protects an
entrenched informational norm. In 1991, Congress enacted the
TCPA “in light of evidence that consumers ‘consider automated
or prerecorded telephone calls, regardless of the content or the
initiator of the message, to be a nuisance and an invasion of
privacy.’”367 The statute itself explains: “Many consumers are
outraged over the proliferation of intrusive, nuisance calls to
their homes from telemarketers.”368 As the Supreme Court
recently noted, a leading Senate sponsor of the TCPA described
robocalls in 1991 as “the scourge of modern civilization. They
wake us up in the morning; they interrupt our dinner at night;
they force the sick and elderly out of bed; they hound us until
we want to rip the telephone right out of the wall.”369

364. Campbell v. Facebook, Inc., 951 F.3d 1106, 1117 (9th Cir. 2020)
(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
365. In re Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litig., 956 F.3d 589, 598 (9th
Cir. 2020) (citing Campbell, 951 F.3d at 117–19).
366. See Campbell, 951 F.3d at 1117 (relying on Spokeo to link statutory
protections of privacy to injuries that traditionally provided grounds for a
suit).
367. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 3, Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Pol.
Consultants, 140 S. Ct. 2335 (2020) (No. 19-631), 2019 WL 6115075 (citing
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, § 2(10), 105
Stat. 2394).
368. Pub. L. No. 102-243, § 2(6), 105 Stat. 2394.
369. See Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Pol. Consultants, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2344
(2020) (Kavanaugh, J., plurality opinion) (quoting 137 CONG. REC. 30821
(1991) (statement of Sen. Hollings)).
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The TCPA is an information use restriction: It prohibits
“any person within the United States from making any call
using any automatic telephone dialing system . . . to any
telephone number assigned to a cellular telephone service.”370 In
other words, the statute restricts how a consumer’s telephone
number may be used. And given the statute’s history, there is
little doubt that Congress codified an informational norm.371
The circuit courts of appeals are divided on when violations
of the TCPA confer Article III standing. The contextual integrity
legal framework sheds light on which side of the split is correct.
In Salcedo v. Hanna,372 the Eleventh Circuit held that receiving
an unsolicited text message—sent in violation of the TCPA—did
not create a concrete injury in fact.373 The court repeatedly
emphasized that the plaintiff had received only a single
unwanted text message and said that neither Congress’s
judgment nor history supported standing.374 Ultimately, the
court concluded that the “chirp, buzz, or blink of a cell phone
receiving a single text message is more akin to walking down a
busy sidewalk and having a flyer briefly waived in one’s face.
Annoying, perhaps, but not a basis for invoking the jurisdiction
of the federal courts.”375
Fifth,377
Other
circuits—including
the
Second,376
378
379
Seventh, and Ninth —have disagreed. Contextual integrity
suggests that calls and texts that violate the TCPA do create a
370. Petition for Cert., supra note 367, at 3 (internal quotation marks,
brackets, and ellipses omitted) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii)).
371. See S. REP. NO. 102-178, at 3 (1991) (“Many consumers and consumer
representatives believe that legislation is necessary to protect them from these
calls. One survey found that about 75 percent of persons contacted favored
some form of regulation of these calls, and one-half of these favored prohibiting
all unsolicited calls.”).
372. 936 F.3d 1162 (11th Cir. 2019).
373. Id. at 1168–74.
374. Id. at 1168–72.
375. Id. at 1172.
376. See Melito v. Experian Mtkg. Sols., Inc., 923 F.3d 85, 92–93 (2d Cir.
2019).
377. See Cranor v. 5 Star Nutrition, LLC, 998 F.3d 686, 690 (5th Cir. 2021).
378. See Gadelhak v. AT&T Servs., Inc., 950 F.3d 458, 461–63 (7th Cir.
2020) (Barrett, J.).
379. See Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp., 847 F.3d 1037, 1042–43 (9th
Cir. 2017).
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concrete injury in fact because Congress imposed restrictions on
the use of automated telephone equipment in direct response to
widespread outrage—outrage that evidences an entrenched
informational norm.380
The Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA) prohibits
information dissemination; it provides in relevant part: “A video
tape service provider who knowingly discloses, to any person,
personally identifiable information concerning any consumer of
such provider shall be liable to the aggrieved person.”381 The
impetus for this rather specific restriction was Robert Bork’s
Supreme Court nomination Senate confirmation hearings in
1988.382 A newspaper published a profile of Bork “based on the
titles of 146 films his family had rented from a video
store . . . . Members of the Judiciary Committee denounced the
disclosure.”383 As one senator explained, “[i]t is nobody’s
business what Oliver North or Robert Bork or Griffin Bell or Pat
Leahy watch on television or read or think about when they are
home.”384 The swift legislative action and bipartisan outrage
signal that the VPPA’s dissemination restriction tracks an
entrenched informational norm.385
Courts weighing the Article III implications of the VPPA’s
dissemination restriction have correctly and unanimously
concluded that violations of the law create a concrete injury.386
The Ninth Circuit pointedly noted that the statute “identifies a
substantive right to privacy that suffers any time a video service
provider discloses otherwise private information. As a result,
every [statutory] violation presents the precise harm and
infringes the same privacy interests Congress sought to
protect.”387

380. See Telephone Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105
Stat. 2394.
381. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1).
382. See S. REP. NO. 100-599, at 5–7 (1988).
383. Id. at 5.
384. Id.
385. See id. at 2 (describing a long line of statutes passed by Congress prior
to the VPPA to expand and give meaning to the entrenched right of privacy).
386. See Perry v. CNN, Inc., 854 F.3d 1336, 1341 (11th Cir. 2017); In re
Nickelodeon Consumer Priv. Litig., 827 F.3d 262, 274 (3d Cir. 2016);
Eichenberger v. ESPN, Inc., 876 F.3d 979, 982–84 (9th Cir. 2017).
387. Eichenberger, 876 F.3d at 983–84 (alterations omitted).
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The FCRA is “America’s first federal consumer information
privacy law and one of the first information privacy laws in the
world.”388 Several scholars have mapped credit reporting’s
evolution in the United States starting shortly after the Civil
War up and through the rise of consumerism in the 1950s.389
The FCRA is an extraordinarily complex statute that has been
amended several times,390 but the history of its inception is
straightforward: Congress became interested in regulating
credit reporting in the 1960s in response to perceived abuses
among credit reporting agencies.391 Congress found that credit
reporting agencies collected any and all available
information—from sexual orientation to alcohol consumption
habits—and often disclosed the contents of these then-secret
dossiers to law enforcement.392 Congress enacted the FCRA “to
comprehensively regulate consumer reporting and the practice
of assembling files about consumers in order to evaluate them
for
credit,
employment,
tenancy,
‘consumer-initiated’
transactions, or other opportunities.”393
This history suggests that the FCRA established and
shaped many now-entrenched norms about information
practices in the credit reporting industry. Before the FCRA,
illegitimate access to credit reports was widespread: “A 1969
study of the [credit reporting] industry found that anyone with
sufficient knowledge of the consumer reporting industry could
obtain reports on other individuals.”394 As a result of the FCRA’s
restrictions on disclosures, norms surrounding disclosure of
388. CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW AND
POLICY 270 (2016).
389. See id. at 271 (discussing JAMES B. RULE, PRIVATE LIVES AND PUBLIC
SURVEILLANCE: SOCIAL CONTROL IN THE COMPUTER AGE (1974)).
390. See id. at 275.
391. See id. at 271; The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) and the Privacy
of your Credit Report, ELEC. PRIV. INFO. CTR., https://perma.cc/KN49-MYDM
(“CRAs assemble reports on individuals for businesses, including credit card
companies, banks, employers, landlords, and others. The FCRA provides
important protections for credit reports, consumer investigatory reports, and
employment background checks.”).
392. See HOOFNAGLE, supra note 388, at 271.
393. Id. at 270.
394. Id. at 275 (citing James B. Rule et al., The Dossier in Consumer
Credit, in ON RECORD: FILES AND DOSSIERS IN AMERICAN LIFE (Stanton Wheeler
ed., 1969)).
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credit information have become particularly strong—the statute
enumerates who can request a credit report, limits credit checks
to specific purposes, and requires individualized notice and
consent from prospective employees.395 As a result, many
violations of the FCRA should be understood as breaching
entrenched informational norms. For example, if an employer
runs a credit check without first obtaining consent, courts
should consider that a concrete injury in fact because the FCRA
has established a norm against the practice.396
But not all violations of the FCRA contravene entrenched
informational norms. In Spokeo, the Supreme Court specifically
discussed the disclosure of an incorrect zip code.397 The
dissemination of an incorrect zip code is potentially a violation
of the FCRA, but it doesn’t necessarily breach an entrenched
informational norm.398 The Court suggested that the incorrect
zip code wasn’t a concrete injury in fact because it was “difficult
to imagine how the dissemination of an incorrect zip code,
without more, could work any concrete harm.”399 But without
contextual integrity’s key insight, speculating about the
likelihood of a concrete harm is an analytical dead end. The
better way to analyze the example is to simply ask: does the
dissemination of an incorrect zip code breach an entrenched
informational norm? The answer may often—although not
always—be no.400
In TransUnion, the Court held that 1,853 class members
who had false OFAC designations disseminated to third parties
had a concrete injury in fact.401 There can be little doubt this
conclusion is consistent with the contextual integrity
framework: falsely labeling someone a potential terrorist to a

395. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b.
396. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b) (providing conditions for furnishing and
using consumer reports for employment purposes).
397. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 342 (2016).
398. See id. (finding the dissemination of an incorrect zip code to present
no material risk of harm).
399. Id.
400. Cf. Matthew B. Kugler, From Identification to Identity Theft: Public
Perceptions of Biometric Privacy Harms, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 107, 145–46
(2019) (illustrating that the dissemination of an incorrect zip code can produce
concrete harms).
401. See TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2208–09 (2021).
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potential lender or employer violates entrenched informational
norms.402
But the Court also held that 6,332 class members who
stipulated that their credit reports had not been disclosed to
third parties lacked a concrete injury under the FCRA, because
their “harm is roughly the same . . . as if someone wrote a
defamatory letter and then stored it in her desk drawer.”403 The
contextual integrity framework shows that this conclusion is
probably wrong, though it’s not totally indefensible. On the one
hand, TransUnion’s OFAC-matching process was woefully
deficient and endured for inexcusably long,404 which suggests
that TransUnion has little respect for entrenched informational
norms. But there is a closer question about whether actual
nondisclosure of false information breaches informational
norms in the same way that actual disclosure so obviously does.
If the majority is right that the false designations were not
disseminated to any third partiesa dubious proposition, at
best405—then it’s difficult to conclude that the undisclosed false
designations contravened an informational norm. At the very
least, however, the Court should have remanded the case with
instructions to allow the 6,332 plaintiffs to show their credit
reports were disseminated beyond what was stipulated.406
The FCRA also includes information access rights, and
violations of these access rights constitute information

402. See id. at 2208 (“Under longstanding American law, a person is
injured when a defamatory statement ‘that would subject him to hatred,
contempt, or ridicule’ is published to a third party.”).
403. Id. at 2210.
404. See id. at 2215 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
TransUnion “made surprisingly few changes” after [losing in
Cortez]. It did not begin comparing birth dates. Or middle initials.
Or citizenship. In fact, TransUnion did not compare any new piece
of information. Instead, it hedged its language saying a consumer
was a “potential match” rather than saying the person was a
“match.”
id. at 2221 (“[T]his is a rather odd case to say that Congress went too far.”); id.
at 2222 (“[T]hen there is the standalone harm caused by the rather extreme
errors in the credit reports.”).
405. See supra notes 202–204 and accompanying text.
406. Cf. TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2212 (characterizing this possibility as
a “serious argument” but nonetheless coming to the cursory conclusion that
the “inferences on which the argument rests are too weak”).
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withholding injuries.407 Before the FCRA, consumers had no
right to access their credit reports, and the credit reporting
trade association told its members that reports “must not be
revealed to the subject reported on.”408 Congress has amended
the FCRA to make access more affordable and readily
available.409 Today, the right to access one’s own credit
report—and to correct erroneous information—is a deeply
entrenched informational norm, so violations of the right of
access should be considered concrete injuries in fact.410
It’s for this reason that the TransUnion majority’s
information withholding holding is clearly wrong. The Court
held that everyone except the named plaintiff lacked standing
to pursue the withholding claims because they “identified no
downstream consequences from failing to receive the required
information.”411 But the contextual integrity framework
condemns the “downstream consequences” inquiry, and instead
asks whether the statute particularizes a right against
breaching an informational norm. As we’ve already seen, the
FCRA adequately particularizes several informational
interests, and Justice Kagan’s TransUnion dissent identifies
several implausible assumptions underlying the majority’s
information-withholding conclusion.412 In short, the FCRA has
established an informational norm that empowers individuals
to access their credit reports; when TransUnion sent every class
member a pair of non-compliant, opaque, and confusing

407. See HOOFNAGLE, supra note 388, at 278 (“[I]f the consumer report is
relied upon at all to make an adverse decision, the consumer should be told.
In employment situations, the employer is required to provide a copy of the
consumer report used to make the determination and a statement of the
applicant’s rights under the FCRA.”).
408. Id. at 274 (citing JAMES B. RULE, PRIVATE LIVES AND PUBLIC
SURVEILLANCE: SOCIAL CONTROL IN THE COMPUTER AGE (1974)).
409. See Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No.
108-159, §§ 211212.
410. See Melinda Opperman, The Importance of Checking Your Credit
Score on a Regular Basis, CREDIT.ORG, https://perma.cc/G3Y5-P9B4
(explaining that consumers regularly check their credit score and annual
credit report).
411. TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2214 (2021) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
412. See id. at 2225–26 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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mailings, it breached that norm. As a result, every class member
had a concrete withholding injury.
In 2008, Illinois enacted the Biometric Information Privacy
Act (BIPA).413 BIPA prohibits the collection and retention of
biometric identifiers by non-governmental actors absent
informed written consent.414 BIPA’s prohibitions are best
understood as information collection and information use
restrictions.415
BIPA provides an excellent illustration of the intractable
nature of the concreteness inquiry for informational injuries
because the law is privately enforceable.416 Under Spokeo, how
should a court answer the question of whether an illegal
collection or retention of a facial recognition scan is a sufficiently
concrete injury? BIPA supplies a stringent procedural
framework for obtaining informed consent,417 but Spokeo singles
out procedural violations as falling short of a concrete injury.418
The contextual integrity legal framework supplies answers
to these questions. Matthew B. Kugler has shown that “people
are concerned about the collection of biometric information, even
when it is presented in mundane, matter-of-fact contexts,” “that
they are willing to forgo benefits to avoid the collection of
biometric information, and that they would be willing to pay
more for services that protect biometric privacy.”419 Kugler’s
empirical work also shows that Americans reactions to the use
of biometric technology can be variable. For example, most
respondents were fairly comfortable with limited uses closely
related to security (e.g., unlocking a phone using facial
recognition), whereas supermajorities were uncomfortable with
broad scale public tracking.420

413. Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14 (2008).
414. See id. §§ 10, 15.
415. See id. § 5 (describing the Act as an effort to regulate “the collection,
use, [and other aspects] of biometric identifiers and information”).
416. See id. § 20.
417. See id. § 15(b) (providing three prerequisites before a private entity
may obtain a person or customer’s biometric identifier or information).
418. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 342 (2016).
419. Kugler, supra note 400, at 111 (2019); see id. at 121–30 (reviewing
participant responses from various studies involving private use of biometric
data).
420. Compare id. at 112, with id. at 138–41.
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Kugler’s findings strongly suggest that new informational
norms about biometric information are becoming entrenched.
Outside a few narrow examples, survey respondents showed
widespread discomfort with practices that potentially violate
BIPA.421 As a result, most violations of BIPA—though perhaps
not all—breach informational norms and therefore create
concrete injuries.
At least some courts have recognized that BIPA violations
create concrete injuries.422 For example, in a case involving
Facebook’s photo-tagging suggestion feature, the Ninth Circuit
held that the plaintiffs had Article III standing because BIPA’s
prohibitions “were established to protect an individual’s
concrete interests in privacy, not merely procedural rights.”423
BIPA cases to date represent low-hanging fruit; much more
difficult questions about the concreteness of procedural
violations loom. Kugler’s analysis rightly shows that Spokeo’s
substance/procedure distinction is of limited utility in these
second-wave BIPA cases.424 The contextual integrity legal
framework avoids these semantic games and cuts to the heart of
Kugler’s empirical findings: that there are informational norms
against many uses of biometric technology, irrespective of
whether the legal violations are characterized as procedural or
substantive.425
The Drivers Privacy Protection Act (DPPA)426 is another
example of an information use restriction that protects
entrenched informational norms. The DPPA restricts how motor
421. See id. at 140 (“Using facial recognition to track people on public
streets (68.1% uncomfortable), detect photos of celebrities online (73.8%), or to
link profiles of people across social networking sites (69.1%) made majorities
uncomfortable.”).
422. See, e.g., Patel v. Facebook, Inc., 932 F.3d 1264, 1274 (9th Cir. 2019);
Rosenbach v. Six Flags Ent. Corp., 129 N.E.3d 1197, 1207 (Ill. 2019). But see
Rivera v. Google, Inc., 366. F. Supp. 3d 998, 1013 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (“Plaintiffs
do not present any evidence showing that Google commercially ‘exploited’ their
faces or the face templates they created. Without more, Plaintiffs’ injury in
this case does not bear a close relationship to the tort of intrusion upon
seclusion.”).
423. Patel, 932 F.3d at 1274 (internal quotation marks omitted).
424. See Kugler, supra note 400, at 145–49 (outlining the dilemma
whereby procedural violations are easily demonstrable but insufficient to
bring adverse claims).
425. See supra note 298 and accompanying text.
426. 18 U.S.C. § 2721.
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vehicle records may be used.427 Like the TCPA, Congress
enacted the DPPA in response to widespread outrage at abusive
informational practices. The DPPA was a “reaction to . . . a
series of abuses of drivers’ personal information,” including the
1989 death of actress Rebecca Schaeffer, who was killed by an
obsessed fan who obtained her address through her California
motor vehicle record.428 One senator explained: “Many
Americans are infuriated and, more importantly, they are
vulnerable to these violations of privacy.”429
In Heglund v. Aitkin County,430 the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit recognized that violations of the DPPA
create concrete injuries.431 In that case, a former law
enforcement officer’s ex-husband accessed her personal
information in violation of the DPPA; an audit of the state’s
driver’s license database revealed that her information had been
accessed 446 times in a ten-year period.432 The Eight Circuit
refused to dismiss the case on standing grounds: “In enacting
the DPPA, Congress recognized the potential harm to privacy
from state officials accessing drivers’ personal information for
improper reasons. . . . [The plaintiffs] claim that [the defendant]
violated the DPPA’s substantive protections by invading [her]
privacy.”433 Here again, a court’s reasoning initially seems to
turn on a substance/procedure distinction.434 But contextual
integrity shows us that the DPPA’s protections are substantive
because violating the statute also violates an entrenched
informational norm. In other words, the informational norm
makes the statutory protection substantive.

427. See id. § 2721(a) (restricting disclosures); id. § 2721(b) (providing
exceptions for “[p]ermissible [u]ses”).
428. The Drivers Privacy Protection Act (DPPA) and the Privacy of Your
State Motor Vehicle Record, ELEC. PRIV. INFO. CTR., https://perma.cc/T77CNT2R.
429. Id.
430. 871 F.3d 572 (8th Cir. 2017).
431. See id. at 578.
432. Id. at 575–76.
433. Id. at 577–78.
434. See id. at 578 (distinguishing this substantive allegation from a
procedural violation in a different case concerning a “statutory duty to destroy
personally identifiable information the cable company lawfully obtained”).
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Although not privately enforceable, the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act’s Privacy Rule (HIPAA or
“the Rule”) is an example of a legal authority that codified
preexisting information dissemination and information access
norms. The Rule provides that a covered entity “may not use or
disclose protected health information, except as permitted or
required by” the Rule.435 Congress enacted the statute in 1996
and the Rule was finalized in 2000.436 But Americans expected
confidentiality in their medical records long before 2000.
Prosser’s privacy tort taxonomy identified civil medical
disclosure cases from the 1920s and ’30s.437 And both before and
after HIPAA’s enactment, state statutes have both restricted
medical disclosures438 and mandated patient access to medical
records.439
Like HIPAA, the Family Educational Rights and Privacy
Act (FERPA)440 is not privately enforceable, and, like HIPAA, it
protects entrenched informational norms regarding information
dissemination and information access.441 FERPA, also known as
the Buckley Amendment after its principal sponsor, Senator
James Buckley, prohibits educational institutions from
disclosing “personally identifiable information in education
records” without the written consent of the student or, if the
student is a minor, the student’s parents.442 While there are a
dearth of legislative records preceding the law’s initial

435. 25 C.F.R. § 164.502(a) (2013).
436. Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, HHS, https://perma.cc/LL77U3AX.
437. See Prosser, supra note 359, at 393 n.88 (citing Banks v. King
Features Syndicate, 30 F. Supp. 352 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) (newspaper publication
of x-rays of woman’s pelvic region under Oklahoma law); Griffin v. Med. Soc’y,
11 N.Y.S.2d 109 (Sup. Ct. 1939) (publication in medical journal of pictures of
plaintiff’s deformed nose); Feeney v. Young, 181 N.Y.S. 481 (App. Div. 1920)
(public exhibition of filmed caesarian operations)).
438. See, e.g., N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6530(23) (McKinney 2021) (defining
“professional misconduct” to include the revealing of “personally identifiable
facts, data, or information obtained in a professional capacity without the prior
consent of the patient”).
439. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 18 (McKinney 2019).
440. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g.
441. See id. (protecting dissemination of and access to information
pertaining to students).
442. Id. § 1232g(b)(2).
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enactment, Senator Buckley later explained in a speech to the
Legislative Conference of Parents and Teachers that FERPA
“was adopted in response to ‘the growing evidence of the abuse
of student records across the nation.’”443 States have also sought
to regulate and restrict access to educational records,444 further
illustrating the existence of an informational norm against both
unfettered access and unjustified withholding.
2. Authorities that Only Occasionally Create an Injury in Fact
This section reviews a host of legal authorities that have a
more tenuous relationship to entrenched informational norms.
As a result, sometimes a plaintiff that alleges a violation of one
of these statutes will have a concrete injury in fact, but
sometimes not.
We’ve already seen an illustration of a collection injury that
does not violate an entrenched informational norm. In Hancock
v. Urban Outfitters,445 the D.C. Circuit held thatwhile it is a
violation of the D.C. I.D. Act to request a customer’s zip code at
a retail point-of-sale transaction—the “naked assertion that a
zip code was requested and recorded without any concrete
consequence” was insufficient for Article III standing.446
Retailers routinely ask consumers for personal information
at point-of-sale transactions—loyalty programs, after all, are
premised on the connection between a consumer’s purchases
and a stable identity, whether it’s a phone number, email
address, or other identifier. It’s therefore implausible that the
D.C. I.D. Act protects an entrenched informational norm against
requesting something as vague as a zip code since people
routinely share far more personalized information in retail
transactions. The law’s prohibitions do not map onto entrenched
informational norms because they simultaneously outlaw too
443. Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), ELEC. PRIV.
INFO. CTR., https://perma.cc/S72V-SUUJ.
444. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 34H (2019) (granting the
department of education the right to promulgate regulations controlling state
administration of student information).
445. 830 F.3d 512 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
446. Id. at 514; see D.C. CODE § 47-3153(a) (2022) (“[N]o person shall, as a
condition of accepting a credit card as Payment for a sale of goods or services,
request or record the address or telephone number of a credit card holder on
the credit card transaction form.”).
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much and too little: the law prohibits even requests for
information but includes an exception “if the information is
necessary for the shipment, delivery, or installation of consumer
goods, or special orders of consumer goods or services.”447
This is not to suggest that no violations of the D.C. I.D. Act
are enforceable. Certain types of transactions may dictate
stronger interests in discretion and using a consumer’s
information in a way that is inconsistent with informational
norms is rife with potential abuse. But it does suggest that the
D.C. Circuit’s conclusion in Hancock was rightcontextual
integrity explains that a retailer’s request for a zip code does not
violate entrenched information collection norms and, without
more, there is therefore no concrete injury.
The Cable Communication Policy Act (Cable Act)448
provides in relevant part that a “cable operator shall destroy
personally identifiable information if the information is no
longer necessary for the purpose for which it was collected .”449
In Braitberg v. Charter Communications,450 the Eighth Circuit
held that retaining customer records in violation of the Cable
Act did not create a concrete Article III injury.451
The opinion’s reasoning failed to supply a coherent
line-drawing principle or explain why Congress couldn’t
regulate information use and retention practices. But
contextual integrity helps answer both questions. Few
Americans would be surprised to learn that companies hoard
customer data, and this country has never really sought to
implement a legal mandate to destroy or purge data.452 Because
there is no entrenched informational norm to destroy
unnecessary data, the statutory violation is not, alone, sufficient
for Article III.453 Reflecting on Braitberg’s reasoning, one
447. D.C. CODE § 47-3153(a)–(b) (2022).
448. 47 U.S.C. §§ 521–573.
449. Id. § 551(e).
450. 836 F.3d 925 (8th Cir. 2016).
451. See id. at 931.
452. See Peter C. Ormerod, A Private Enforcement Remedy for Information
Misuse, 60 B.C. L. REV. 1893, 1942 (2019) (noting that, outside a few
exceptions, under current law any information “may be gathered by anyone
and kept forever” (internal quotation omitted)).
453. See Braitberg, 836 F.3d at 930 (“Congress’s role in identifying and
elevating intangible harms does not mean that a plaintiff automatically
satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a person a
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commentator suggested that “the Eighth Circuit cast doubt on
whether Congress can expand privacy rights beyond their
common law scope at all.”454 But that’s too strong. Congress can
expand privacy rights beyond the common law, but concrete
informational injuries require a violation of both the statute and
an informational norm.455 Unless and until Americans’
expectations about information retention practices change,
violations of information destruction mandates do not create
concrete injuries.
The Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA)456
imposes a truncation requirement for payment card numbers on
point-of-sale transaction receipts.457 The law stipulates that “no
person . . . shall print more than the last 5 digits of the card
number or the expiration date.”458 Because FACTA is privately
enforceable, many circuit courts have struggled with the
question of whether non-compliant receipts create a concrete
injury in fact.459 Courts have engaged in convoluted analyses
about how likely a given non-compliant receipt is to aid in
effecting identity theft.460 Contextual integrity helps solve this
statutory right and purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate that
right.” (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 341 (2016))).
454. Baude, supra note 216, at 223.
455. See id. (discussing the constraints the common law places on
Congress’s ability to expand privacy rights).
456. Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952 (2003).
457. Id.
458. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g)(1).
459. See, e.g., Kamal v. J. Crew Grp., Inc., 918 F.3d 102, 114 (3d Cir. 2019)
(discussing how courts analyze standing when presented with a private
enforcement action under FACTA); Katz v. Donna Karan Co., 872 F.3d 114,
121 (2d Cir. 2017) (same); Meyers v. Nicolet Rest. of De Pere, L.L.C., 843 F.3d
724, 727 (7th Cir. 2016) (same); Bassett v. ABM Parking Servs., Inc., 883 F.3d
776, 783 (9th Cir. 2018) (same); Muransky v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc., 979 F.3d
917, 925–26 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (same); Jeffries v. Volume Servs. Am.,
Inc., 928 F.3d 1059, 1067 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (same).
460. For example, in Kamal v. J. Crew Grp.a case in which the retailer
printed the first six and last four digits of the plaintiff’s payment cardthe
court explained that the “threat consists of a highly speculative chain of future
events” wherein the plaintiff “loses or throws away [the receipt], which is then
discovered by a hypothetical third party, who then obtains the six remaining
truncated digits along with any additional information required to use the
card, such as the expiration date, security code or zip code.” Kamal v. J. Crew
Grp., Inc., 918 F.3d 102, 114 (3d Cir. 2019) (internal quotation omitted)
(alteration in original).
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intractable and unknowable inquiry by avoiding it altogether.
Instead, courts should evaluate whether disclosing more than
five digits breaches an informational norm. Surely some
non-compliant receipts do, like those that print all or nearly all
digits, but many situations—like printing six or seven
digits—likely do not.
There are several recent examples of statutes and proposals
that restrict how information may be used, but the legal
prohibition’s relationship to informational norms is still
ambiguous. The California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA)461
introduces new conditions on data processing.462 Its “rule does
not stop companies from using data for new purposes—it just
requires disclosure if they do so.”463
Legislative proposals in recent years have included
additional information use restrictions. For example, U.S.
Senator Maria Cantwell has introduced the Consumer Online
Privacy Rights Act (COPRA).464 Among many other provisions,
COPRA includes a duty of loyalty, which prohibits covered
entities from “processing or transfer[ring] . . . covered data in a
manner that causes or is likely to cause” financial, physical, or
reputational injuries; physical or other offensive intrusions into
an individual’s private affairs or concerns; or other substantial
injuries to an individual.465 Proposed legislation in New York
similarly seeks to prohibit covered entities from “us[ing]
personal data . . . in any way that . . . will benefit the online
service provider to the detriment of an end user.”466

461. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–1798.199.100 (West 2020).
462. See id. § 1798.100(b) (“A business that collects a consumer’s personal
information shall . . . inform consumers as to the categories of personal
information to be collected and the purposes for which the categories of
personal information shall be used.”).
463. Anupam Chander et al., Catalyzing Privacy Law, 105 MINN. L. REV.
1733, 1757 (2021).
464. Consumer Online Privacy Rights Act, S. 2968, 116th Cong. (2019); see
Adam Schwartz, Sen. Cantwell Leads with New Consumer Data Privacy Bill,
ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Dec. 3, 2019), https://perma.cc/EJX4-RW5L.
465. S. 2968 § 101(b).
466. S.B. 5642 § 1102(b), 242 Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019).
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Data-use restrictions, while commonplace elsewhere in the
world, are a novel development in domestic law.467 While some
empirical evidence suggests that Americans favor use
restrictions and balk when they learn about unfettered data
flows,468 it’s ambiguous whether flouting a use restriction would
violate an entrenched informational norm. Of course, over time,
an informational norm against unfettered data use may become
entrenched. And in that case, use restrictions could be a
successful norm-establishment example. But because these are
mostly
proposals—and
others
are
not
individually
enforceable— the norm is inchoate.
The same is true for these authorities’ information access
provisions. Norms surrounding access to the dossiers that
enable targeted advertising are ambiguous. The CCPA and the
proposed COPRA both include rights of access, but targeted
advertising is a much more recent phenomenon than credit
reporting.469 As norms over access to marketing datasets evolve,
it’s possible that consumers will increasingly expect reliable
access.
***
Contextual integrity shows us that judicial investigations
into an information injury’s “concreteness” need not be an
irresolvable morass. While contextual integrity reveals that
courts often reach the correct conclusion about a given injury’s
concreteness, the legal framework helps refine and guide Article
III standing analysis.
467. See Chander et al., supra note 463, at 1747–49 (comparing the United
States’ domestic informational privacy laws with those of the European
Union).
468. See, e.g., Kirsten Martin & Ari Waldman, Perceptions of the
Legitimacy of Algorithmic Decision-Making 22 (Nov. 16, 2021) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author) (“In general, respondents judged human and
algorithmic decisions as less legitimate when based on aggregated data than
when based on specific data for a given decision . . . .”); Noah Apthorpe et al.,
Discovering Smart Home Internet of Things Privacy Norms Using Contextual
Integrity, PROC. ACM ON INTERACTIVE, MOBILE, WEARABLE & UBIQUITOUS
TECHS., May 2018, at 1, 9–10 (finding that survey respondents responded most
negatively to situations where “information is used for advertising”).
469. See, e.g., Letter from Jane C. Horvath, Senior Dir., Glob. Priv., Apple,
to Dr. Jan. Rydzak, Ranking Digit. Rts. (Nov. 19, 2020),
https://perma.cc/5E6G-W5GS (PDF) (“Privacy-focused ad networks were the
universal standard in advertising before the practice of unfettered data
collection began over the last decade or so.”).

176

79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 101 (2022)
V.

JUSTIFICATIONS

This Part identifies the legal framework’s virtues and then
responds to objections about the proposal.
A. Virtues and Advantages
There are four interrelated virtues and advantages to the
proposed legal framework.
The first virtue of the legal framework is that it solves the
line-drawing problem described in Part II.B.1. The breach of an
informational norm supplies the source of a plaintiff’s concrete
injury. Where the defendant has not breached a norm in
violation of a statute, the plaintiff lacks a concrete injury.
The analysis thus keys courts into the true stakes of
informational-injury cases: has the defendant engaged in an
informational practice that contravenes entrenched norms?
This directs the courts away from unknowable inquiries—like
how likely identity theft will follow from a noncompliant
receipt,470 or how likely it is that an employer will rely on the
results of an internet search query to reject a prospective
employee’s application.471
Many of the problems that arise in privacy injury cases flow
from the need to make speculative and subjective assessments
about the likelihood of visceral “real harm.”472 The proposed
framework eschews these difficult issues—charging courts with
a question about the here and the now.
Nissenbaum explains that contextual integrity “not only
helps predict when an activity or practice is likely to arouse
protest, indignation, or resistance, it helps explain and pinpoint

470. See, e.g., Jeffries v. Volume Servs. Am., Inc., 928 F.3d 1059, 1067 (D.C.
Cir. 2019) (discussing the difference in risk between a receipt containing only
the first six digits and a receipt with the entire card number (citing Kamal v.
J. Crew Grp., Inc., 918 F.3d 102, 116–17 (3d Cir. 2019))).
471. See, e.g., Spokeo, Inc., v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 353–54 (2016)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing amici briefs that describe the threat to
Robins’s employment prospects); id. (“I therefore see no utility in returning
this case to the Ninth Circuit to underscore what Robins’s complaint already
conveys concretely: Spokeo’s misinformation cause[s] actual harm to [his]
employment prospects.” (internal quotation omitted) (alteration in original)).
472. Cf. id. at 341 (majority opinion) (suggesting that “the risk of real
harm” can “satisfy the requirement of concreteness”).
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the sources of objection.”473 This legal framework builds on these
insights by recognizing that the practices that arouse protest,
indignation, and resistance are themselves the source of a legal
injury.
The second virtue of the legal framework is that it is
responsive to concerns of political accountability and the
separation of powers described in Part II.B.2. The framework
allows for judicial discretion and control over Article III injuries
but simultaneously empowers legislatures to have a say in the
evolution of informational norms. Importantly, the framework
applies to both private-sector and public-sector actors. Far from
raising separation of powers concerns, the framework recognizes
that violating expectations is itself the injury and hence treats
all norm violators the same. At the same time, the framework
remains faithful to the judiciary’s concerns about advisory
opinions and undifferentiated procedural injuries. Focusing the
analysis on norms avoids abstraction concerns by tying the
plaintiff’s injury to the violation of expectations about
informational practices.
The third virtue is related to the first two. Making norms
and expectations the source of the plaintiff’s injury protects
privacy for privacy’s own sake. Other approaches to this problem
use privacy as a stand-in for other interests—like risk and
anxiety.474 Privacy is but a proxy for other harms, like the
increased risk of identity fraud and the mental anguish
associated with worrying about it.475 According to these
approaches, courts and commentators can use “privacy” as a
shorthand, but what we’re really protecting is a right to control
information and to protect it from potential misuse.476
In contrast, the framework proposed here does not treat
privacy as a stand-in for other underlying interests. Instead, it
protects people’s expectations about injurious informational
practices without needing to rely on the attenuated possibility
of financial harm. Like Nissenbaum says, “What people care
473. NISSENBAUM, supra note 29, at 148.
474. See Solove & Citron, supra note 231, at 756–67.
475. See id. at 754 (“Most courts consider plaintiffs’ fear, anxiety, and
psychic distress about their increased risk of identity theft and other abuses
too remote to warrant recognition.”).
476. See id. at 764–67 (analyzing the consumer’s fear of information
misuse in the privacy context).
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most about is . . . that [information] flows appropriately,”477 and
the proposed legal framework gives teeth to people’s
expectations about appropriate informational practices.
The final advantage of the proposed framework is that it
simultaneously provides a solution to all three injury in fact
requirements: concreteness, particularization, and actuality.
Concreteness is easy and has been the source of most discussion.
In short, breaching a statutorily protected norm is itself a
concrete injury.
Relying on legislative authorization helps solve
particularization concerns. A court determines whether the
plaintiff is among the injured by assessing whether the
defendant actually contravened the plaintiff’s expectations
about informational practices. This type of analysis avoids the
advisory-opinion ban by ensuring that an informational-injury
plaintiff is seeking to vindicate her own interests and
expectations and not seeking “general compliance with
regulatory law” or attempting to vindicate interests owed to
society at large.478
Finally, the framework solves the future-injury conundrum
by sidestepping it entirely. Unlike other approaches that rely on
risk calculations, the legal framework charges courts with
assessing an injury to expectations in the past and present. This
makes contravention of norms and expectations an “actual”
injury, rather than a conjectural or speculative one.
B.

Responding to Objections

There are five objections to the proposed framework that
are worth confronting directly.
One objection reprises an argument I’ve made in the past.
It goes like this: There is no justification for
477. NISSENBAUM, supra note 29, at 148.
478. Cf. Spokeo Inc., v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 349 (2016) (Thomas, J.,
concurring)
If Congress has created a private duty owed personally to Robins to
protect his information, then the violation of the legal duty suffices
for Article III injury in fact. If that provision, however, vests any
and all consumers with the power to police the “reasonable
procedures” of Spokeo, without more, then Robins has no standing
to sue for its violation absent an allegation that he has suffered
individualized harm.
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counter-majoritarian Article III standing doctrine in cases
against private-sector actors.479 In the absence of
separation-of-powers concerns, courts should automatically
defer to the legislature and should not substitute their judgment
for political consensus.480 The framework makes a fundamental
error, the objection goes, because it allows courts to invalidate
legislatively prescribed causes of action that pose no risk of
interfering with the Executive Branch.481
While it’s true enough that separation of powers concerns
are at a nadir in cases against private defendants, they are not
absent entirely. Congress could not, for example, authorize
advisory opinions.482 Attempting to limit Article III standing to
the advisory-opinion ban exclusively is unworkable because
“courts saw in some procedural legal rights the same things that
had concerned them about advisory opinions—the possibility of
courts being asked to adjudicated only “[t]he public nonconcrete
interest in the proper administration of the laws.”483 And that
concern remains present in both cases against governmental
and non-governmental actors.
The rejoinder to this objection is twofold. First is that the
framework always respects political consensus that reflects
expectations about informational norms. The judiciary will
supplant legislative judgment only in cases where legislatures
operate without regard to norms or where legislatures’ attempts
to fashion new norms are unreasonable or ineffectual. Second is
that the framework’s particularization mechanic avoids cases
that create the possibility of adjudicating non-concrete
interests. The framework requires a plaintiff to allege a
violation of an entrenched informational norm owed to her
specifically, and doing so ensures that courts do not issue
advisory opinions.

479. See, e.g., Ormerod, Privacy Injuries, supra note 22, at 42–43.
480. See id. at 39 (arguing that it is for Congress to determine an
informational injury’s “concreteness” and not the judiciary).
481. Id.
482. See Baude, supra note 216, at 226 (explaining that the illegality of
advisory opinions is one of the “paradigm rules of Article III”).
483. See id. at 226–27 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580
(1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
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A second objection is that the framework is too narrow, that
it only resolves informational-injury standing cases. In fact, the
framework’s circumscribed focus on informational injuries
should instead be considered an asset. As the Supreme Court’s
recent ERISA standing case deftly illustrates, intangible
injuries unrelated to information raise distinct considerations
that cannot be resolved with reference to informational
norms.484 The contextual integrity framework solves a wide
swath of intangible injury questions and shouldn’t be cast aside
because it is not a panacea for every intangible injury.
A third objection is that the framework is vague, complex,
and indeterminate. Of course, some questions under the
framework remain difficult. But the advantage of the
framework is that it provides a principled way to analyze
privacy injuries and that it eschews unknowable inquiries.
Matthew B. Kugler’s empirical study of biometric privacy
injuries is a deft illustration of how to identify entrenched
informational norms,485 and computer scientists have also used
contextual integrity to empirically measure informational
norms.486 In any event, discerning norms is considerably easier
than many of the inquiries about informational injuries that
courts currently engage in.487 For example, scholars have
recently used a survey method to reveal informational norms
about internet-connected smart-home devices.488 The authors’
statistically significant findings489 should give courts and
litigants confidence that similar survey evidence can help

484. See Thole v. U.S. Bank N. Am., 140 S. Ct. 1615, 1621 (2020)
(explaining that noneconomic informational injuries still need to be “concrete”
even in the context of a statutory violation).
485. See Kugler, supra note 400, at 119–30.
486. See, e.g., Sebastian Benthall et al., Contextual Integrity Through the
Lens of Computer Science, 2 FOUNDS. & TRENDS PRIV. & SEC. 1, 12 (2017)
(“[Contextual integrity] posits contextual information norms to model privacy
expectations and explains when such expectations are morally legitimate and
warrant societal protection.”).
487. See, e.g., Kamal v. J. Crew Grp., Inc., 918 F.3d 102, 116–17 (3d Cir.
2019) (speculating about the likelihood of identity theft in a FACTA case);
Spokeo, Inc., v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 341 (2016) (speculating about the “risk
of real harm” in an incorrect zip code dissemination case).
488. See Apthorpe et al., supra note 468, at 4–9.
489. See id. at 11.
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definitively address difficult and seemingly ambiguous
questions about entrenched informational norms.
A fourth objection has surfaced previously: that a legal rule
that relies so heavily on expectations is circular. This objection
argues that legal rules produce norms and expectations, and
therefore relying on norms and expectations to fashion legal
rules is misguided because a court’s use of expectations results
in the judiciary merely talking to itself.490
While the theory may be intuitive, the objection is
ultimately groundless because empirical research shows only
the most tenuous causal relationship between judicially
prescribed rules and widespread beliefs.491 Matthew B. Kugler
and Lior Jacob Strahilevitz have repeatedly shown that Fourth
Amendment doctrine rarely tracks people’s actual expectations
and beliefs.492 For example, Kugler and Strahilevitz have shown
that a clear plurality of a representative sample of survey
respondents do not draw distinctions between short- and
long-term location tracking, despite numerous recent Fourth
Amendment cases suggesting that the latter raises more
significant constitutional problems than the former.493 Even
more striking, Kugler and Strahilevitz have shown that Fourth
Amendment circularity is a myth—that the Supreme Court, at
best, can “move privacy expectations only slightly and only for a
very short time.”494
A final objection is a wholesale rejection of the
framework—that we shouldn’t require a Katz-esque
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy analysis to ascertain whether
a court has jurisdiction. Courts have proven poor at discerning
expectations of privacy in Fourth Amendment merits
determinations, the thinking goes, so inviting judges to perform
a similar analysis in the civil jurisdictional context is a mistake.
There are two problems with this final objection: first,
scholars have shown that actual expectations are irrelevant to
490. See Kugler & Strahilevitz, The Myth, supra note 336, at 1750.
491. See, e.g., Matthew B. Kugler & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Actual
Expectations of Privacy, Fourth Amendment Doctrine, and the Mosaic Theory,
2015 SUP. CT. REV. 205, 218–20 (2016).
492. See id. at 209–10 (describing how individual expectations do not align
for the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
493. See id. at 245–59.
494. Kugler & Strahilevitz, The Myth, supra note 336, at 1751.
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Fourth Amendment decisions;495 and second, pessimism about
courts’ ability to use actual expectations in Article III decisions
isn’t warranted.
As to the former, Orin S. Kerr has argued that the Katz
inquiry only has a single objective step and has illustrated that
defendants’ subjective expectations are irrelevant to
outcomes.496 Matthew Tokson undertook a comprehensive study
of reasonable-expectation-of-privacy Supreme Court decisions
and found three principles that drive outcomes—the intimacy of
the place or thing targeted, the amount of information sought,
and the cost of the investigation.497 Together, this research
suggests that—notwithstanding Fourth Amendment doctrine’s
expectations-based nomenclature—the Fourth Amendment
analysis bears little resemblance to the contextual integrity
framework outlined here. And as to the latter, the illustrations
in Part IV.B and the empirical research highlighted in this Part
suggest that courts are perfectly capable of using informational
norms and actual expectations of privacy, should they try.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court keeps saying that some statutorily
authorized intangible injuries don’t create an Article III injury
in fact. But the Court hasn’t explained how to identify injuries
that are sufficient for Article III purposes and hasn’t provided a
justification for overriding political consensus. Scholars and
jurists have attempted to bring order to the Court’s recent
standing jurisprudence, but those attempts have fallen short of
solving these dual incoherencies with the doctrine.
This Article fills the void. Contextual integrity is a powerful
tool for identifying when an injury is concrete, and fashioning a
legal framework based on contextual integrity supplies courts
with a justification for dismissing cases disconnected from
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shared conceptions of informational norms. The legal
framework has substantial explanatory power—identifying
what animates recent Article III cases and providing a roadmap
for future privacy disputes.
Without a principled mechanism for evaluating intangible
injury cases, standing jurisprudence threatens every
individually enforceable privacy right. A contextual integrity
legal framework supplies courts, legislatures, and litigants with
a consistent and coherent way to protect privacy.

